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SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA: A NEW INTERNAL FOCUS?
YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA
AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DE-
MOCRACY. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994. xiv + 329 pp.
Reviewed by Gregory H. Fox*
INTRODUCTION
Self-determination is a concept increasingly at war with itself. The
doctrine is now generally understood as a binding principle of interna-
tional law, drawing its normative force primarily from treaties but also
from important sources of customary law.1 At the same time, with the
effective end of decolonization and the virtually unanimous refusal of
states to recognize a right of secession, the legal norm appears to have
been deprived of much of its content. Thus, one finds in respected legal
authorities statements asserting both that achievement of self-determina-
tion is a crucial prerequisite to a peoples' enjoyment of all other human
rights,2 and that the traditional understanding of the right as a vehicle
for independent statehood has been rendered essentially meaningless.'
Self-determination, it seems, has become either everything or nothing.
Commentators and legal actors have responded to this crisis of
meaning by devising a number of strategies designed to avoid one of
two equally unsettling conclusions that seem to follow from the current
state of normative incoherence: either that self-determination as a legal
norm was relevant only to the specific historical period of decoloniza-
tion or that its ascent into law was misguided from the start. Primary
* Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. J.D., New York
University School of Law (1986); B.A., Bates College (1982).
1. See Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 209 (1992). In the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the collected U.N.
Member States declared that they considered "the denial of the right of self-determination as
a violation of human rights .... " Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 25,
1993, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/24 (Part I) (1993); reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1665
(1993).
2. Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination
and of the Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for the
Effective Guarantee and Observance of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 82, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/82 (1992) (achieving right to self-determination is one
among several "imperatives for the full enjoyment of all human rights").
3. James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: 'Peoples' or 'Governments', in THE RIGHTS
OF PEoPLES 55, 56 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
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among these strategies has been to view the right as operating solely
within the territorial confines of existing states, manifesting itself not in
the relations between colonies and metropolitan powers or states and
self-defined "peoples" but in the structure of domestic political institu-
tions. These institutions may include minority protection regimes, demo-
cratic political processes, safeguards for cultural rights, and various
forms of federative autonomy. Viewing self-determination as an "inter-
nal" right may require a substantial reordering of a state's domestic law
in order to achieve compliance; it would not, however, require the
redrawing of its boundaries.
The legitimacy of an internal right to self-determination is as yet
uncertain, in particular if it is to be regarded as wholly supplanting the
traditional conception of an external right rather than merely coexisting
as an alternative means of achieving political autonomy.4 Yet if any
argument for an internal right is to be accepted, a crucial threshold must
be crossed. The "self' endowed with the right to determine its future
must coincide with the territorial state. Granting the right to any substate
entity, in this view, begins the slippery slope toward legitimizing seces-
sion. This fear arises from the range of options available to bona fide
right-holders, which at least for colonial territories - and in the popular
mind for others as well - included full independent statehood.5 Recent
practice has attempted to narrow this range.6 However, an internal right
avoids this debate entirely by excluding definitions of the self based on
ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, historic, or other criteria that in any
way deviate from the boundaries of the state existing at the time the
benefits of the right are claimed.
Of the many ways in which the international community has at-
tempted to focus the right inward, the fostering of democratic gover-
4. The viability of an internal right has clearly been enhanced by the transition to
majority rule in South Africa and by progress toward resolution of the Palestinian question,
the two mainstays of U.N. resolutions equating self-determination with independent statehood.
5. Resolution 1541 elaborated the obligations imposed upon U.N. Member States by
Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, concerned with colonial territories whose peoples had not yet
"attained a full measure of self-government." U.N. CHARTER art. 73. Such an achievement
could be said to occur through "(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free
association with an independent State; or (c) integration with an independent State." G.A.
Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR 4th Comm., 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
6. In November 1991, the Badinter Commission of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia was asked for its opinion as to whether the Serbian populations of Bosnia
and Croatia had the right to self-determination. The Commission answered that while they did
indeed have such a right, its exercise could not (in the absence of agreement) result in
changes to state borders existing at the time of independence. Rather, the right required
acknowledgement of a peoples' cultural identity and their legal protection as minorities under
relevant international instruments. Opinion No. 2, International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1497, 1498-99 (1992) [hereinafter
Badinter Opinion No. 2].
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nance has by far attracted the most attention. An extensive normative
and institutional framework has arisen to encourage transitions to demo-
cratic rule and the strengthening of existing democratic institutions. The
primary vehicle for these efforts - the monitoring of elections and
referenda - is the subject of Yves Beigbeder's new book, International
Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: Self-Deter-
mination and Transitions to Democracy.' While Beigbeder has primarily
written a survey of international practice, eschewing any serious attempt
to situate election monitoring within a conceptual framework of inter-
state relations, the relation between democratization and self-determina-
tion haunts his discussion. Indeed the book's subtitle - "Self-Determi-
nation and Transition to Democracy" - suggests that Beigbeder plans
to join the ongoing debate over the nature of the "self' and marshal an
argument for a territorial self based on the abundance of multilateral
practice he reviews.
Curiously, such an argument does not appear in the book. Beigbeder
acknowledges a theory of "internal self-determination" which, he asserts,
generally coincides with traditional democratic theory. He also makes
the rather obvious point that both internal and external self-determina-
tion "imply a democratic process." 9 In general though, internal democra-
cy and self-determination pass each other unnoticed in Beigbeder's
account, the former having a scant role in shaping conceptions of the
latter.'0 As a result, the reader is given an answer to the debate over
conceptions of the "self' without having been asked the crucial ques-
tion: how can an idea grounded in claims for independent statehood
against empires, colonizers, and hegemonic powers be transformed into
a theory of domestic governance? Until such a conceptual link is sup-
plied, it seems rather curious to write a book that treats self-determina-
tion and democracy as virtual siblings, for a purely external account of
self-determination represents a claimed entitlement to dismantle existing
territorial states, while democracy is an attempt to reinforce loyalty to
existing states by including all citizens in a national process of delibera-
tion and choice. Yet Beigbeder seems content to take monitored votes
where he finds them, whether they be in established states, secessionist
entities, or former colonial territories.
. 7. YvEs BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1994).
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id.
10. Chapter I is promisingly entitled "Self-Determination and Democracy," and Chapter
4 addresses "Democracy, Self-Determination and the United Nations." Both chapters, howev-
er, discuss these concepts one after the other, providing little if any sense of how the they
relate in theory or have interacted in U.N. practice.
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As it happens, I agree with what seems to be Beigbeder's view that
an internal conception of self-determination is slowly gaining accep-
tance. Since international law is made by states, which have an obvious
stake in their own territorial integrity, this should not be a surprising
development. Yet it is a conception of the right that is challenged not
only by the unleashing of nationalist passions that Professor Franck has
termed "post-modem tribalism"'" but by many scholars as well.'2 In this
review, I would like to attempt to supply the conceptual link between
self-determination and internal democracy missing from Beigbeder's
account. This will involve not only making claims for an exclusively
territorial self but reviewing the equally crucial question of which indi-
viduals belong to the territory. This step necessarily follows from the
International Court of Justice's (ICJ or Court) definition of self-determi-
nation as "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peo-
ples"'13 - requiring one to ascertain precisely whom to ask. I will
suggest that trends have emerged disfavoring ethnic or other criteria
substantially supplied and adjudged by the groups seeking application of
the right to their cause. Once this framework is made clear, Beigbeder's
review of international practice in election monitoring may be recast as
evidence that states are now willing to invest substantial resources,
including increasingly scarce political capital, in the viability of an
internal self.
I. THE NATURE OF THE SELF: AN EMERGING
TERRITORIAL CONCEPTION
A. The Competing Criteria
Virtually all of the non-self-governing and trust territories that
achieved independence in the post-war era retained their colonial-era
boundaries.' 4 To achieve self-determination, the only territorial relation-
ship to be altered was that with the metropolitan power. Achieving
independence, in other words, did not come at the expense of another
sovereign state's territory or that of an adjacent colony. Decolonization,
11. Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System, 240
R.C.A.D.I. 125-49 (1993-II).
12. See, e.g., Michael Walzer, The New Tribalism, DISSENT, Spring 1992, at 164; Angela
M. Lloyd, Note, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 419 (1994).
13. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 11, 33 (Oct. 16).
14. As Malcolm Shaw concludes, "a deterministic view was taken of the territory-people
nexus." MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 144 (1986).
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therefore, did not present the conflict between self-determination and the
principle of territorial integrity that is the distinctive feature of seces-
sionist claims.
In order for post-colonial self-determination to achieve an equivalent
equilibrium - in which the secessionists' trade-off between autonomy
and territorial integrity is not implicated - a similar agreement would
seem to be necessary on the precise nature of the self. An internal view
of self-determination accomplishes this goal by equating the self with
the existing territorial state. This remains a highly controversial proposi-
tion, though it is the crucial missing link in Beigbeder's implicit view
that monitoring national elections is an example of self-determination.
To oversimplify somewhat, the internal view is but one of three compet-
ing conceptions of the self now extant: (1) recognizing as a legitimate
"self' any group claiming coherence as such, whether wholly self-de-
fined or according to some objective criteria; (2) limiting groups quali-
fying under (1) to existing internal administrative boundaries of the state
- the uti possidetis principle; or (3) equating the self and national
boundaries as co-extensive. As the following discussion will suggest,
international law appears to be moving toward the third conception on a
variety of fronts.
1. The Self-Defined "Self'
The first alternative regards as a legitimate self any "people" dem-
onstrating a coherent group identity. In theory, such a showing might be
wholly subjective: the crucial characteristics asserted by a group as
defining its identity could be accepted both as legitimate criteria and as
being fulfilled by whatever historical or ethnographic data put forward
by the group. But given that the legal doctrine of self-determination is a
right vested in "peoples,"'5 a wholly subjective conception of the self is
necessarily excluded. "People" is presumably a term with an ascertain-
able meaning that encompasses certain groups and excludes others.
However difficult and controversial the process of definition may be, it
is by its nature a search for an objective meaning.
Yet a review of the literature immediately reveals that objectivity
provides little in the way of limits on potential candidates for "selves."
Ethnicity is the most frequently mentioned basis for group identification,
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter Political Covenant]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 2, 2 (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976).
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but other characteristics are often substituted or added, such as those
demonstrating ties to a particular territory. Professor Brilmayer, for
example, in evaluating competing claims to territory, would consider
such factors as the immediacy of the group's historical grievance, the
extent to which the group has kept its claim alive, whether the territory
has been resettled by members of a state's dominant group, and the
nature of the historical grievance undergirding the territorial claim.
16
While each of these categories may allow a compelling case of injustice
to be made in a given case, their application is potentially limitless. In
and of themselves, these categories place little in the way of a burden of
proof on groups seeking recognition. As a result, few would be disquali-
fied.'7 The promise of limits provided by use of the objective term
"people" thus appears to be largely false.
Such a devolution to subjectivity is likely not only because the
notion of a "people" is an elastic one, but also because it inheres in the
current process of identifying such groups. The international communi-
ty's primary means of bestowing collective legitimacy on a people or
self - recognition through membership in international organizations -
almost always occurs after a secessionist movement has succeeded. No
regular institutional process exists to sort legitimate from illegitimate
"selves" during the necessarily lengthy process of a struggle for inde-
pendence. The result would be and now is confusion, as a great many
secessionists and their parent states make conflicting claims against each
other with no prospect of an authoritative body engaging in a test of
those claims against whatever "objective" definition of the self has
emerged. A definition, like this one, subject only to autointerpretation is
little better than no definition at all.
As a result of these normative and institutional deficiencies, one
finds scant support in the international community for viewing the self
as any group claiming coherent identity and/or connection to a territory.
While many international lawyers take the view that international law
does not prohibit secession, few defend the existence of an affirmative
right to secede from sovereign states.'" Moreover, such a right cannot be
16. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177, 199-201 (1991).
17. Martti Koskenniemi argues that because "nationalism" is defined through ongoing
political struggle, with legitimate nations emerging only after physical and rhetorical battles
have been waged, a priori "[t]here are no general criteria by which nations can be
recognised." Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal
Theory and Practice, 43 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 241, 260-63 (1994).
18. Where such support exists, it is usually in cases of extreme human rights abuse in
which no other remedies appear feasible. See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-01 (1979).
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divined from the major sources of law from which a right to self-deter-
mination draws its normative force. 9 The drafters of the U.N. Charter
were concerned primarily with the vast colonial empires existing at the
end of the Second World War, not ethnic or other minorities within
their borders.' The General Assembly's seminal Resolution 1514, which
elaborates Member States' Charter obligations regarding self-determina-
tion, appears to preclude secession by asserting the equal importance of
territorial integrity.2 '
More ambiguous is common Article 1 of the Economic and Political
Covenants, which applies the right of self-determination to "all peoples"
and not just those in colonial territories. Moreover, a number of State
Parties to the Covenants sharply rejected India's declaration regarding
Article 1, which provides that the right does not apply "to sovereign
independent states or to a section of a people or nation - which is the
essence of national integrity."'22 In its General Comment on Article 1 of
the Political Covenant, however, the Human Rights Committee has
suggested a generally internal focus by requiring State Parties to de-
scribe in their reports "the constitutional and political processes which in
practice allow the exercise of this right., 23 The Committee has also
effectively denied itself the opportunity to make precise findings on the
contours of the right by holding that, because Article 1 grants rights to
collective "peoples," an individual cannot raise self-determination claims
under the Covenant's Optional Protocol.24
19. For an excellent overview of these instruments, see Patrick Thomberry, Self-Determi-
nation, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 867 (1989).
20. Committee I/1 of the San Francisco Conference reported that the principle of self-
determination in the Charter "implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the
right of secession." Summary Report of Sixth Meeting of Committee 1/1, 6 U.N.C.I.O 296
(1945); see also John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 195-96 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); CRAWFORD, supra note 18, at
90-91 (Charter's view of self-determination likely refers to states' right to choose their form
of government without outside interference).
21. "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations." G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66,
67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
22. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as of 31 Decem-
ber, 1993, at 116 (declaration), 134-37 (objections), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/12 (1994).
23. General Comment 12/21 (1984), reprinted in 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 181 (1987); see also
PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 215 (1991).
24. Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, reprinted in Report of the Human
Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 221, 228, U.N. Doc. A/43/40
(1988).
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The Declaration on Friendly Relations also contains a clause assert-
ing the primacy of territorial integrity over self-determination. 5 While
the application of this trumping principle is limited to states "possessed
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed, or colour," there are at least two
reasons to hesitate before reading this clause as suggesting an affirma-
tive right to secession for groups living under nondemocratic regimes.
First, early in the drafting process, the United States offered an alterna-
tive text which directly equated representative government with the
fulfillment of self-determination; this proposal was rejected.26 Second,
read in context the clause appears to address racial issues, thereby
limiting its application "only [to] Pariah states like South Africa, which
oppresses its majority on racial grounds. 27
Even if the normative core of the right to self-determination leaves
any room for an auto-definition of the self, the international response to
secessionist movements and the recent fragmentation of certain states
has done little to advance such an interpretation. A review of the thirty
major secessionist movements of the post-war era28 reveals no formal
support in the United Nations for those groups' demand for independent
statehood. 29 Indeed, the United Nations nearly drove itself to the brink
of constitutional breakdown and bankruptcy in dispatching troops to
prevent the province of Katanga from seceding from the Congo. 0
25. The Declaration on Friendly Relations states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encourag-
ing any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting them-
selves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
26. MORTON H. HALPERIN & DAVID SCHEFFER, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER 24 n.33 (1992).
27. Thornberry, supra note 19, at 877.
28. The list is taken from TED R. GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK 294-98 (1993).
29. This conclusion is based on a review of United Nations Yearbooks, which make note
of all resolutions adopted by U.N. organs. See Alexis Heraclides, Secessionist Minorities and
External Involvement, 44 INT'L ORG. 341, 346 (1990); JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND
THE UNITED NATIONS 86-111 (1987).
30. Sally Morphet, U.N. Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring, in UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLD 183, 197-99 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993).
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Bilateral support for these movements presents a more complex
picture; few states have accorded diplomatic recognition to secessionist
groups while logistical support has been more common. However,
"incumbent governments have tended to attract more support than
insurgents have."'" Western countries supported independence for the
Baltic republics during the entire post-war era, but because this took the
form of continuing to recognize previously independent states, its opinio
juris value is unclear.32 Iraqi Kurds have been given substantial military
and humanitarian assistance, but talk of independence has been studious-
ly avoided.33 India for a time supported Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka,
but in 1987 signed a peace accord with the Sri Lankan government
which not only "signalled to the Tamils that it would not help them to
establish a separate state" but led to India's becoming a direct target of
attacks by the LTTE (Tamil Tigers).3' The Tibetan struggle against
China has received little more than rhetorical support.35 To date, no state
has recognized the break-away Russian republic of Chechnya, despite
widespread condemnation of Russia's tactics in suppressing the rebel-
lion.36 On the other hand, Saudi Arabia supported the unsuccessful
attempt by southern Yemenis to secede from the newly unified nation,
though importantly it stopped short of formal recognition.37 Perhaps of
equal importance to the general reluctance of third parties to find a
"self' endowed with rights in these cases is the virtually blanket refusal
of states to do so when faced with secessionist movements of their
own.38 As Heather Wilson points out, "if the States most intimately
31. Heraclides, supra note 29, at 353.
32. See discussion infra notes 48-53.
33. Kurds Still Alone, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 51; Solving the Kurds, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 31, 1992, at 17; Independence by Stealth, ECONOMIST, May 9, 1992, at 43.
34. S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, The Dynamics of Separatism: the Case of Sri Lanka, in
SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 48, 60-63 (Ralph R. Premdas et al.
eds., 1990).
35. HALPERIN & SCHEFFER, supra note 26, at 11-12; W. Gary Vause, Tibet to
Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1575, 1587-97 (1989).
36. Mike Trickey, Russians and Chechens Extend Tenuous Truce, MONTREAL GAZET-rE,
Feb. 16, 1995, at A13.
37. See David Killion, Saudi Meddlers in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 19.
Indeed, during the course of the short civil war, which ended in July 1994, no state recog-
nized the secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). 40 KEESING'S RECORD OF
WORLD EVENTS 40078 (1994). Additionally, the Security Council passed two resolutions in
which it urged the end to all outside supplies of arms to the DRY. See S.C. Res. 931, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. SIRES/931 (1994); S.C. Res. 924, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/924 (1994).
38. The Czech-Slovak split of 1993 did not involve a government recognizing a seces-
sionist movement but a mutual decision by both sides to divide the country. While Ethiopia
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involved with a situation which other States claim is subject to new
rules of international law deny the existence of these new rules, their
denial must cast grave doubt upon the legal character of these rules in a
system which depends on practice and consent for its development.,
39
Finally, it may be argued that the normative value of third party
support for secessionist movements must be tempered by the ICJ's
holding that unilateral irtervention in domestic conflicts is prohibited
when it bears "on matters in which each State, by the principle of State
sovereignty, to decide freely."' Acts falling within this formulation are
illegal and cannot, by definition, contribute to the growth of a legal rule.
This argument is complex, for it begs the monumentally difficult ques-
tion of whether a state's denial that a group within its territory consti-
tutes a legitimate "self' is one such internal "matter." The question of
whether unilateral declarations of "selfhood" by such groups have legal
effect - that is, whether a state cannot deny self-determination to a
group objectively constituted as a self - is precisely the issue that third
party support for the groups is invoked to clarify.
This circular reasoning may perhaps be broken when the internation-
al community as a whole has spoken on the question, as when it recog-
nizes a liberation movement as the "legitimate representative" of a
people.41 In that case, a state's denial of self-determination would not be
an internal "matter" in the ICJ's formulation, and at least some third
party assistance would be permitted. But even in such a case of collec-
tive action, the designation of a legitimate self comes not from the acts
of third parties but by the international community's collective act of
recognition. Short of such an act, there is simply no authoritative way to
determine whether a "self" exists and, consequently, whether the parent
state's right to be free from externally supported aggression is supersed-
did allow Eritrea to hold a referendum on secession in 1993 - resulting in an overwhelming-
ly favorable vote and eventual independence for the territory - the government that permit-
ted the secession was not the same government that had opposed Eritrean nationalism during
the 30-year civil war. Indeed the new government had close ties with the secessionist groups;
one of its early acts was to promulgate a National Charter that "accepted the right of the
Eritrean people to self-determination." GOVERNMENT OF ERITREA, ERITREA: BIRTH OF A
NATION 5 (1993).
39. HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 126 (1988).
40. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27).
41. Thus, when the U.N. General Assembly recognized the African National Congress
and other groups as representing the people of South Africa, third party states were encour-
aged to provide assistance. G.A. Res. 6(I), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 10, 14,
U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976) (appealing to Member States "to provide all assistance required by
the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movements during their
legitimate struggle").
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ed.42 Given such indeterminacy, it would be imprudent to argue that the
Court's general rule against intervention should be superseded in cases
of purely unilateral action. As noted, a general rule of nonintervention
renders any assistance to secessionists devoid of normative value.
The dissolutions of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, despite giving birth to a myriad of new states
ultimately recognized by the international community, have made only
uncertain contributions to a substate conception of the self. The stron-
gest opinio juris that could have emerged from either break-up would
have been statements of an entitlement to self-determination before the
fact of independent statehood was clearly evident. Established concep-
tions of the self have followed this pattern. Resolution 1514 was such a
general statement regarding colonial territories, as was the General
Assembly's recognition of SWAPO,4 3 the ANC," and the PLO45 as
"legitimate" representatives of peoples well before independence (or
majoritarian elections) were presented to the Assembly as afait accom-
pli. Similarly, the OAU's decision to seat a POLISARIO delegation in
November 1985 represented a statement that the people of the Western
Sahara held rights against those actively denying their aspirations to-
ward autonomy - notably Morocco.46 Recognition after statehood has
been achieved, or after the state resisting independence finally acquiesc-
es, does not necessarily affirm a prior right to seek independence. It
may simply constitute a recognition by states or international organiza-
tions that according to the prevailing declarative theory, a new state has
come into existence and must be dealt with as such.
International reaction to the break-up of the Soviet Union - and in
particular the Baltic states, whose departure precipitated its dissolution
- generally fell into this second weaker category.47 While the United
42. See WILSON, supra note 39, at 117 (While Third World states are willing to extend
premature recognition to colonial territories, where a group seeks secession from a sovereign
state, "the principle of territorial integrity and fear for their own vulnerability determines their
policies.").
43. See G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 130, U.N. Doc.
A/31/39 (1976). Beigbeder correctly points out that it was rather inconsistent for the Assem-
bly to designate SWAPO as the "sole and authentic" representative of the Namibian people
while the Security Council was at the same time attempting to organize elections to determine
precisely that question. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 153.
44. See G.A: Res. 6(I), supra note 41.
45. See G.A. Res. 3210, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
46. David Seddon, Morocco at War, in WAR AND REFUGEES: THE WESTERN SAHARA
CONFLICT 98, 111 (Richard Lawless & Laila Monahan eds., 1987).
47. See Self-Determination: Secession, Autonomy and Integration, in CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: OPPORTUNITIES AT A TIME OF MOMENTOUS CHANGE 57, 59
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States had, in principle, never recognized the incorporation of the
Baltics into the Soviet Union, this was mostly a status of symbolic
significance.48 In the aftermath of the August 1991 coup, President Bush
announced not that preexisting relations with the Baltics would continue
in some heightened fashion but that the United States was "prepared
immediately to establish diplomatic relations with their governments."'49
More importantly, prior to President Yeltsin's decree of August 24,
1991 recognizing the independence of Latvia and Estonia (Russia had
recognized Lithuania in 1990), only Iceland had established diplomatic
relations with a Baltic state, and that was with Lithuania.50 The Europe-
an Community waited until August 27 to call for the establishment of
relations." The United States extended recognition on September 2.52
The CSCE and the United Nations waited still longer - until after
independence had been affirmed by the State Council of the Soviet
Union on September 6 - to admit the Baltics to membership.53
Recognition of the former Yugoslav republics unfolded in a similar
fashion. The unraveling of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) began formally on September 27, 1990 when the Slovenian
Parliament declared it would no longer recognize federal legislation as
binding.' 4 Slovenes voted overwhelmingly for independence in a referen-
dum on December 23, as did Croatia on May 19, 1991, Macedonia on
September 9, and Bosnia (in a disputed vote boycotted by Bosnian
(Rend Lefeber ed., 1994) (remarks of Bart Driessen); Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Note,
Secession: State Practice and International Law After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 299, 321 (1993).
48. It was also one of limited opinio juris value, since virtually every other state in the
world had recognized their incorporation. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 131 (1990). Moreover, speaking to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine on
August 1, 1991, as pressure for Baltic independence was intensifying, President Bush warned
against promotion of "a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred." The U.S. Commitment
to Reform, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 1991, at 596, 597. U.S. policy throughout the
period leading up to independence had as its highest priority preserving President
Gorbachev's precarious hold on power. "The Baltics' achievement of independence after the
August 1991 aborted coup in Moscow can obscure the fact that U.S. policy at no point really
advanced - and may have retarded - the cause of independence for the Baltics." HALPERIN
& SCHEFFER, supra note 26, at 29.
49. U.S. To Establish Diplomatic Relations with Baltic States, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH,
Sept. 2, 1991, at 647 (emphasis added).
50. FACTS ON FILE YEARBOOK 199i 640.
51. Id.
52. U.S. to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Baltic States, supra note 49, at 647.
53. 38 KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 38419 (1991).
54. Marc Weller, Current Developments: The International Response to the Dissolution
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
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Serbs) on October 14. 5 Warfare had been raging since June 1990 when
federal troops attacked the provisional Slovenian militia.5 6 By December
7, 1991, the cohesion of the federal structures had deteriorated to such
an extent that the Badinter Commission of the European Community
determined that the governmental organs of the SFRY "no longer meet
the criteria of participation and representativeness inherent in a federal
State" and that, as a result, "the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via is in the process of dissolution."57
Yet the response of the international community up through the time
the Badinter Commission made its finding (and for a short time thereaf-
ter) was, by and large, to work at holding the old federal structures
together. When the U.N. Security Council first addressed the matter on
September 25, 1991, a number of Member States described the conflict
as an internal one and justified their votes in favor of an arms embargo
solely on the grounds that it had been requested by the SFRY represen-
tative.58 In June 1991, the CSCE voiced its support for the "territorial
integrity" of the federal state.59 In August, the European Community
proposed an arbitration procedure that involved a committee with mem-
bers appointed by the federal presidency, thus making the implicit
assumption that the presidency retained an important degree of legitima-
cy.6° The United States repeatedly opposed early recognition of the
republics, a position it maintained through mid-December 1991.61 In
December the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries de-
nounced "all attempts aimed at undermining the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and international legal personality of Yugoslavia." 62 Also in
December - at a time when Germany had begun making clear its
intention to offer early recognition - Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
urged forbearance until an overall peace settlement could be reached.63
55. Opinion No. 1, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1494, 1496-97 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Opinion No. 1].
56. Weller, supra note 54, at 570.
57. Badinter Opinion No. 1, supra note 55, at 1496-97.
58. Provisional Verbatim Record, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 28-29 (state-
ment of Mr. Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe), 33-36 (statement of Mr. AI-Ashtal, Yemen), 45-46
(statement of Mr. Solanki, India), 49-50 (statement of Mr. Qian Qichen, China), U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3009 (1991).
59. Robert Mauthner, Crisis Policy and Baltics Cause CSCE Disputes, FIN. TIMEs, June
20, 1991, at 2.
60. Weller, supra note 54, at 576.
61. HALPERIN & SCHEFFER, supra note 26, at 36.
62. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the President of the
Seucirty Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/23289 (1991).
63. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex IV, at 21, U.N. Doc. S/23280 (1991) (warning against "early,
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Germany and Italy recognized Slovenia and Croatia on December 23;
other states and international organizations followed over the next five
months, culminating in the admission of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina to membership in the United Nations on May 22, 1992.
64
While this attenuated process might be read as affirming these
states' right to secession, the repeated attempts to achieve peace by
discouraging fragmentation do not suggest that was a motive in extend-
ing recognition. Formal recognition came at a time when any right to
secede (if it indeed existed) had already been exercised. The establish-
ment of relations is more plausibly attributable to states' realistic assess-
ment that diplomatic relations with the republics could only be carried
out through their newly established governments (most of which had
been or would soon be elected). Alternatively, some states may have
judged that the republics would be better protected against external
aggression if they were Member States of the United Nations. In either
case, there was virtually no prospect that the old federal system might
be resuscitated. The former republics were, in fact, states and had to be
dealt with as such.65 Given such practical necessities of the moment,
coupled with earlier efforts to forestall recognition, the ultimate decision
to treat the republics as sovereign implies little about their independence
having been achieved pursuant to a legal right.
This view of the Yugoslav crisis finds support in another aspect of
the international community's reaction: the consistent refusal of those
drafting peace plans for Bosnia to suggest its partition into ethnic mini-
states. The Security Council set the parameters for negotiated solutions
by declaring that "the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina are inviola-
ble."6 The body initially and primarily charged with devising a settle-
ment, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, thus
declared at its inaugural London Conference in August 1992 that any
political settlement in Bosnia must "respect ... the integrity of present
frontiers, unless changed by mutual agreement." 67 While the Vance-
Owen Plan of January 1993, the so-called HMS Invincible Plan of
selective recognition" of the republics in a letter from the Secretary-General to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands).
64. The exception was Macedonia, which was admitted to the U.N. on April 8, 1993.
65. It is crucial to note that even German and Italian recognition on December 23 came
after the dates on which, according to the Badinter Commission, Croatia, Slovenia, and
Macedonia became successor states to the SFRY. Croatia and Slovenia became successor
states on October 8, 1991, and Macedonia became a successor state on November 17, 1991.
Opinion No. 11, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1586, 1589 (1993).
66. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
67. Statement on Bosnia (Aug. 27, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1537 (1992).
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September 1993, and the plan devised by the five nation "Contact
Group" in July 1994 all suggested a variety of provincial and federal
schemes clearly aimed at separating the three dominant ethnic groups,
none attempted to alter Bosnia's existing boundaries or to endow the
ethnic subunits with any degree of international personality.6 None of
the international bodies involved in negotiations has accepted the
Bosnian Serb position that the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic is
entitled either to independence or to join the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in pursuit of a "Greater Serbia."
It may be that in attempting to support the cohesion of multiethnic
states such as the Congo, Nigeria, the Soviet Union, or the SFRY, the
international community is now fighting a losing battle against centrifu-
gal nationalist forces. Yet the normative assumptions underlying that
fight continue to discourage auto-defined conceptions of the self that are
subjective in all but name.
2. The Self Defined by Former Internal
Boundaries: Uti Possidetis Juris
A second conception of the self might limit claims to territories
defined by the internal administrative boundaries of the parent state.
This is generally referred to as the principle of uti possidetis juris,69
which first emerged in boundary treaties between former Spanish colo-
nies in Latin America in the early nineteenth century and was later
68. While the Vance-Owen Peace plan proposed dividing the state into ten ethnically
defined provinces, it provided that those provinces would not "have any international legal
personality and may not enter into agreements with foreign States or with international
organizations."- Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex II, at 21, U.N. Doc. S/25479 (1993). The Vance-Owen Plan was endorsed by the
Security Council in Resolution 820. S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/820 (1993). The second plan, which made more concession to ethnicity by proposing
three constituent republics held together in a central Union, nonetheless endowed only the
Union with international personality; the constitutional arrangements provided that only the
Union might apply for membership in international organizations and become party to Bosnia-
Herzegovina's treaties in force. See Letter from the Charge d'Affaires A.L of the Permanent
Mission of Croatia to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/26377/Add.1 (1993). The third plan, drafted by the United States, the European Union,
and Russia in July 1994, proposed dividing Bosnia between Bosnian Serbs and a newly-
formed Muslim-Croat federation. The agreement establishing the federation was "based on the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT FOR THE FEDERATION, Part I (Establishment) (on file with author). While the
precise relation of the federation to Bosnian Serb territory is not yet clear, U.S. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher described the arrangement as preserving "the state of Bosnia as a
single state within its international boundaries .... " Roger Cohen, New Bosnia Peace Plan
Has Serb Corridor, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A3.
69. Beigbeder does not mention uti possidetis, even in his discussion of colonial-era
monitoring.
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accepted by most African states in the OAU's 1963 Cairo Declaration.70
Uti possidetis also guided the United Nations in several cases of decolo-
nization where parties urged deviation from colonial boundaries. In the
case of British Togoland, French Togoland, and the Gold Coast, for
example, the U.N. rejected calls to hold a plebiscite of ethnic Ewes, who
straddled the three territories. 7' As a result, Ewes now live both in
Ghana and Togo. The U.N. General Assembly has consistently called
for the unity of the Comoros Islands, despite claims to self-determina-
tion by Catholic Mayotte against the predominantly Muslim population
of the other islands.72 Calls to alter boundaries so that all ethnic Somalis
would live in one state were also rejected; Somalis are now dispersed
among Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti.73 There have been some excep-
tions to this practice, 74 but in the vast majority of transitions from
colony to state, the U.N. did not even call for a plebiscite, as it never
seriously considered any alternative to the independence of the territo-
ries other than independence in accordance with existing colonial bound-
aries.75
In the colonial context, uti possidetis served to protect new states
from incessant boundary disputes and endless armed conflicts, once the
colonial powers had left.76 It did so by excluding claims of overlapping
historical title or ethnic kinship from determinations of territorial sover-
eignty. The doctrine freezes title to territory at the time of independence,
a moment sometimes referred to as the "critical date. ' '77 Disputes over
territory are thus focussed solely on what the boundaries were (or were
intended to be if no actual delimitation had occurred) at that moment.
There are two sets of problems, however, with using uti possidetis
as a meaningful limitation on otherwise unlimited auto-definitions of the
70. See Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of
Judge Ajibola); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 564-68 (Dec. 22); 1
CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES 498-510 (2d ed. 1951).
71. SHAW, supra note 14, at 111-12.
72. G.A. Res. 18, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/18 (1994) (recalling
similar resolutions dating to 1973).
73. SHAW, supra note 14, at 110-11; 119-20.
74. The case of the Cameroons is arguably an exception. The territory was administered
by the British as two separate units, and the U.N. Trusteeship Council agreed to this effective
partition, which allowed the south to vote in a plebiscite to join Cameroon while the north
voted to join Nigeria. However, the separate administration ofthe two territories does distin-
guish the disposition of the Cameroons from a complete abandonment of prior colonial
boundaries. See id. at 112-13.
75. Id. at 144.
76. See Territorial Dispute, 1994 I.C.J. at 83-86 (separate opinion of Judge Ajibola).
77. Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at 568.
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self. The first is whether the doctrine in fact represents a substantive
limitation on the exercise of the right to self-determination after the end
of decolonization. The doctrine as it emerged in Latin America and
Africa functioned as a limit on conflicting claims by states to territory
on their common borders. Serving this function, it guided several ICJ
judges in adjudicating the border disputes between ex-colonial territories
presented in the Frontier Dispute (Burkino Faso v. Mali) and Territorial
Dispute (Libya v. Chad) cases. This interstate conception of the doctrine
follows from its origins both in treaties between and among Latin
American states and in the OAU's foundational documents. As the
President of Mali declared at the 1964 Cairo Conference, the doctrine
impelled African states to "renounce any territorial claims. 78 Thus, the
doctrine as traditionally understood did not limit claims by secessionist
groups within states seeking to alter national boundaries. If it did, states
would be prohibited from voluntarily agreeing to such a group's seces-
sionist claims - a restriction not only inconsistent with U.N. practice
79
but contradicted by the very ICJ opinions giving general expression to
the doctrine.80 Alternatively, uti possidetis might be seen as encompass-
ing an obligation to prevent only unwanted secessions, thereby preserv-
ing the option of consensual break-up. But the doctrine modified in this
fashion becomes a tautology: if a secession is unwanted it will, by
definition, be opposed by the parent state. A norm reduced to this
marginal status would add nothing to actions already taken by states in
its absence and would therefore retain little if any value as an indepen-
dent check on auto-definitions of the self.
The Badinter Arbitration Commission suggests a possible way out of
this conundrum through a radical restatement of the doctrine. In its
opinions, as guided by various declarations of the European Community
on the Yugoslav conflict, the Commission described uti possidetis not as
a norm addressed to parent states but as restraining the secessionists
themselves from claiming territory beyond internal administrative
78. Territorial Dispute, 1994 I.C.J. at 88 (separate opinion of Judge Ajibola) (quoting the
President of Mali).
79. The U.N.'s supervision of the referendum on independence in Eritrea, for example,
was premised on an agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrean nationalists that Ethiopia would
permit independence upon a favorable vote. Letter from the Secretary-General to the Presi-
dent of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex I, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/47/5
(1992).
80. A prohibition on consensual modification of borders would be inconsistent with a
corollary to the critical date principle; namely, that a critical date later than the moment of
independence may arise by, for example, a subsequent adjudication or a boundary treaty.
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 401 (Sept.
11).
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boundaries.8 By this the Badinter Commission could not have meant to
legitimize secessions that do adhere to internal borders; that would
impinge the territorial integrity of the parent state.8 2 A more plausible
reading of its short opinions is that secessionists, if successful, cannot
claim a legal right to territory beyond prior internal boundaries, though
the secession itself is an act neither sanctioned nor condemned by
international law.13 On this view, uti possidetis does function to limit the
self to internal boundaries but does not speak to the range of autonomy
options available to such an entity.
So conceived, uti possidetis does not become operative until after a
secession has occurred, since the prior question of whether or not the
secession may occur is one the doctrine does not address. Confining uti
possidetis to a point late in the process of a state's unraveling may pose
problems for the Badinter approach. If a secession is indeed a fait
accompli, the declarative theory of statehood would leave no doubt that
the new entity is a state; it need not be recognized by the international
community, but neither can the fact of statehood be denied by the
withholding of recognition.84 Of course, if the international community
can muster the will not only to withhold recognition but apply sanctions
designed to persuade the secessionists to give up territory beyond the
old internal borders, then the integrity of those borders may be defended
successfully. If, however, the international community cannot maintain a
united front (as it could not on the former Yugoslav republics), then any
claim by the parent state to territory taken by the secessionists in contra-
vention of uti possidetis may quickly become moot, regardless of the
equities involved.
The Northern Cameroons case is instructive in this regard. 5 In that
case, Cameroon sought an order from the ICJ invalidating the incorpora-
tion into Nigeria of the Northern Cameroons Trust Territory, which the
United Kingdom had administered separately from the Southern
Cameroons despite the fact that only a single trusteeship agreement with
81. The Commission affirmed the right of Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina to self-determination but added that "it is well established that, whatever the
circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at
the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the States concerned agree
otherwise." Badinter Opinion No. 2, supra note 6, at 1498.
82. According to Professor Pellet, the actual author of the Badinter opinions, "[u]n tel
droit [of secession] n'existe pas en droit international et aucun des avis de la Commission ne
le consacre." Alain Pellet, Note Sur la Commission D'Arbitrage de la Conference Europeenne
Pour la Paix en Yougoslavie, 37 ANN. FRANgAIS DE DROIT INT'L 329, 341 (1991).
83. See Franck, supra note 11, at 148-49.
84. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-91 (4th ed. 1990).
85. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15 (Dec. 2).
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the U.N. existed.86 Cameroon brought the claim after a plebiscite had
been held in which the inhabitants of the North choose to join Nigeria
rather than Cameroon. Cameroon's fundamental objection was based on
uti possidetis: it claimed the trust territory should have been adminis-
tered as one unit and consulted as such on its future. 7 The Court point-
ed out that not only had the plebiscite already occurred but that the
General Assembly had accepted the results and voted to terminate the
trusteeship agreement.88 Whatever rights might have been claimed under
the agreement had thereby been terminated, and a judgment purporting
to enforce those rights would not have been "capable of effective appli-
cation." 9
While not all successful secessions will receive the legitimating
imprimatur of the General Assembly, many will (and have been) preced-
ed by plebiscites of more or less convincing authenticity. Other seces-
sions may receive bilateral support or support from regional organiza-
tions.' Yet even absent such external affirmation, Northern Cameroons
suggests that the more time that passes after the split and the more
relations with the secessionist territory are functionally structured around
the fact of its autonomy, the more an ex post declaration that boundaries
were impermissibly altered becomes incapable of "effective application."
A second problem with using uti possidetis as a limitation on defin-
ing the self is that it simply does not exclude secession as an option; in-
stead, it merely reduces the number of territorial units threatening the
unity of parent states from any group claiming ethnic cohesion to the
old internal administrative units. Such a reduction may provide little
solace to regimes in parent states. For example, because of its several
hundred distinct ethnic groups, Nigeria is a good example of the ex-
treme fragmentation that would result from an unlimited right of seces-
sion.9' Nigeria contains twenty-one constituent states.92 Should they each
claim status as a "self," Nigeria's territorial integrity would hardly be
86. Id. at 26.
87. Id.
88. G.A. Res. 1608, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/4684/Add.1 (1961).
89. Northern Cameroons, 1963 I.C.J. at 33.
90. In the. Western Sahara, for example, while the General Assembly has affirmed the
territory's right to self-determination, the Organization of African Unity seated a delegation
from the Sahrawi movement Frente Popular para la Liberaci6n de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio
de Oro (POLISARIO) as the territory's representative. Morocco immediately resigned from
the OAU in protest. Seddon, supra note 46, at 111.
91. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY
97 (Helen C. Metz ed., 5th ed. 1992).
92. Id. at 237.
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better secured than if international law placed no limit on their claims to
autonomy. In other words, by continuing to allow substate definitions of
the self, and despite professing to be "neutral" on the remedy of seces-
sion,93 international law ensures that claims of right to secession will
continue to be raised.
3. The Self as Coinciding with the Territorial State
A third view of the self has gained prominence with the end of
decolonization and the assimilation of virtually all territory on earth
within the jurisdiction of some sovereign state. This view regards the
entire territorial state as the self. Any exercise of the right must there-
fore take place within its borders, since there is no other entity (absent
acts of aggression by other states) against which the right to self-deter-
mination might be asserted. For this reason, such a view of the right is
often referred to as "internal" self-determination.
Internal self-determination takes as an important premise the view
that struggles for autonomy often find their roots in the failure of na-
tional political institutions to address the interests of minority groups.
Such failure might take the extreme form of active persecution or a
milder form of an inability to affect national policy, such as may occur
in the case of minorities in states with winner-take-all electoral systems.
In most cases, both mild and extreme forms exist in the historical mem-
ory of the residents of a secessionist territory. 94 Internal self-determina-
tion attempts to ameliorate such histories of exclusion by creating inclu-
sive political processes through which, collectively, the entire population
may chart its own destiny. It "enables the people of a country to choose
their political system, their political, economic and social institutions
and their political leaders, or to make important constitutional political
decisions. 95 In cases of decolonization the people of the territory are
consulted only once; where the self is a sovereign state, however, con-
sultation is ongoing, bolstered by the legal assurances of participation
that an institutionalized democratic system entails.
In recent years, the international community has begun describing
three aspects of such-an inclusive political process as manifestations of
the right to self-determination. The first, as Beigbeder discusses at
length, is democratic elections, which are the primary form of consulta-
tion required by the right. The Cambodia Settlement Accords, for exam-
93. Franck, supra note 11, at 149.
94. GuRR, supra note 28, at 124-29.
95. BEIGBEDER, supra note 5, at 18.
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pie, declare the parties' intent to "ensure the exercise of the right to self-
determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elec-
tions."96 However, for an international community facing an explosion
of secessionist claims, elections serve not only as a consultative device
but also as a means of fostering a civic, as opposed to an ethnic, sense
of identity on the part of the citizenry. In so doing, they help legitimize
national, nonethnic, and nonsectarian political institutions as vehicles for
expressing one's group identity, that is, to make the national "self' not
just a legal construct but one to which citizens feel an actual sense of
connection. The post-Cold War era has seen the rapid growth of such
nation-building efforts, particularly in states experiencing various forms
of civil unrest.9' United Nations organs have consistently singled out
free and fair elections as essential to this transformative process.
98
The second element is protection of minority rights, which traces its
pedigree to the minority regimes of the interwar period99 but is also the
96. Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/46/608 & S/23177, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 180, 181 (1992). This phrase was
reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution establishing the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia. See S.C. Res. 745, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RESfl45
(1992).
97. See Sonia K. Han, Note, Building a Peace that Lasts: The United Nations and Post-
Civil War Peace-Building, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 837 (1994).
98. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 968, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/968 (1994)
(international assistance to resolve the conflict in Tajikistan "must be linked to the process of
national reconciliation, including inter alia free and fair elections"); S.C. Res. 957, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doec. S/RES/957 (1994) (calling on parties to Mozambique conflict to
base reconciliation "on a system of multi-party democracy and the observance of democratic
principles which will ensure lasting peace and political stability"); S.C. Res. 919, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doec. S/RES/919 (1994) (welcoming South Africa's "first all-race multiparty
election and the establishment of a united, democratic, non-racial government"); G.A. Res.
149, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/48/149 (1993) (reconciliation
process in El Salvador requires support for the "democratization process under way"); G.A.
Res. 150, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/150 (1993) (urging
Myanmar to "allow all citizens to participate freely in the political process ... and to
accelerate the process of transition to democracy, in particular through the transfer of power
to the democratically elected representatives"); G.A. Res. 151, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 48th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/151 (1993) (condemning events in Haiti "which abruptly and
violently interrupted the democratic process in that country"); G.A. Res. 152, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 48th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doec. A/RES/48/152 (1993) (urging comprehensive political
solution to Afghan crisis based, inter alia, "on the free exercise of the right to self-determina-
tion by the people, including free and genuine elections"); Assistance to Georgia in the Field
of Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Comm'n. Res. 1993/85, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 3,
at 252, U.N. Doc. E/1993/23 (1993) (encouraging Georgia to continue the "process of
democratization, including elections"); Support for the Restoration of Democracy in Peru,
Hum. Rts. Comm'n. Res. 1992/12, in Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/1993/2, at 46 (1992) (praising Peru's decision "to choose a democratic constituent
congress by means of an election to be accompanied by every guarantee of the free expres-
sion of the popular will").
99. The Permanent Court of International Justice stated:
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for
certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them
Michigan Journal of International Law
subject of more recent legal instruments."m Even where elections are
free and fair, minority groups may by definition find few of their views
reflected in national policy, particularly if a state does not follow a
proportional representation electoral system.'0 ' Groups effectively ex-
cluded from meaningful participation in this fashion, or through outright
discrimination, are increasingly granted protections that focus on their
group status. These rights include not only those of a political nature but
also certain protections of groups' cultural integrity.' °2 In contrast to
rights concerned solely with political participation, minority rights more
closely approximate the collective nature of the right to self-determina-
tion. Indeed, when the Badinter Commission was asked to render an
opinion as to whether Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia were
in race, language or religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside that
population and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the
characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing
special needs.
Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 64, at 17 (Apr. 6). In 1930, the
Permanent Court defined a "community" (or minority) as:
a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion,
language and traditions of their own and united by this identity of race, religion,
language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their
traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbring-
ing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and
rendering mutual assistance to each other.
Advisory Opinion No. 17, Greco-Bulgarian "Communities", 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 17, at
21 (July 31).
100. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 15, art. 27, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 135, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 47th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992) [hereinafter Minorities Declaration)]; THORNBERRY, supra note 23.
The European Community's December 16, 1991 Guidelines on the Recognition of the New
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union require as a prerequisite to recognition the
existence of "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE." 31 I.L.M.
1485, 1487 (1992).
101. The General Assembly has also extended some of these protections to noncitizens,
augmenting states' traditional obligation under international law not to harm aliens present
within their territory. Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals
of the Country in Which They Live, G.A. Res. 144, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Annex, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/40/144 (1985) [hereinafter Minorities Declaration]. Article 5(f) guarantees to
aliens "(t]he right to retain their own language, culture and tradition."
102. The Minorities Declaration, for example provides that states shall take measures:.
to create favorable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express
their charactaristsics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and
customs, except where specific practices are in violation of national law and
contrary to international standards.
Minorities Declaration, supra note 101, art. 4(2); see also Hurst Hannum, Contemporary
Developments in the International Protection of the Rights of Minorities, 66 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1431 (1991).
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entitled to self-determination, it answered almost solely by reference to
"the - now peremptory - norms of international law [that] require
States to ensure respect for the rights of minorities.' ' 3
Third, international organizations are beginning to involve them-
selves in the construction of autonomy regimes within states."° The
various plans involving federation, union, and confederation proposed
for Bosnia by international mediators are the most comprehensive exam-
ples. An international plan for the Krajina Serbs of Croatia would create
a loose federal structure allowing home rule over a variety of crucial
issues. 15
Unlike self-determination in the era of decolonization, the emerging
internal right has not evolved a distinct jurisprudence of its own. As
these three categories of rights suggest, an internal right functions not so
much as an independent source of entitlements but as an analytical
organizing principle. Its own unique contribution consists mainly of
refocussing autonomy claims from the expectation of independence
brought on by the success of decolonization to modes of participation in
the domestic political arena. This shift is made possible by the emerging
international consensus on the value and legitimacy of democratic
processes. The particular legal guarantees represented by an internal
right draw on the jurisprudence of other human rights concerned more
specifically with pluralism and nondiscrimination in domestic politics
in particular, the three mentioned above. In short, internal self-determi-
nation functions as an omnibus interpretive tool, weaving together a
variety of more particular rights in order to demonstrate that a principled
co-existence is possible between claims to group autonomy and the
maintenance of states' territorial integrity.'0 6
103. Badinter Opinion No. 2, supra note 6. Professor Pellet restates the Commission's
holding in even stronger terms:
Le principe du droit des peuples h disposer d'eux-memes est un principe (( h
gdom6trie variable >>; il ne confare pas de droit h l'inddpendance aux peuples ne se
trouvant pas dans une situation coloniale; il constitue en revanche le fondement du
droit des minorit6s A se voir reconnaitre une identitt propre ....
Pellet, supra note 82, at 343.
104. See Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over Autonomy
Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1542 (1991).
105. Roger Cohen, Plan for Croatia Would Give Serbs Autonomy in Some Areas, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at A3.
106. This refocussing of the right is evident in recent General Assembly resolutions. At
the Forty-Eighth Session, the Assembly's resolution on self-determination focussed almost
exclusively on the few remaining cases of decolonization, South Africa (and states against
which it was accused of committing aggression) and the Israeli occupied territories. The only
non-apartheid-related independent state mentioned is Mozambique, and the Assembly strongly
suggests its recognition of an internal right by praising, under the general heading of "the
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One might object to such a conception of self-determination that it
represents a retreat from the right's ascent into binding law. An internal
right that offers no specific guarantees of its own, it could be argued, is
drained of the determinacy necessary to any meaningful notion of
"right" under law."° However, this argument misses the crucial role of
the right as an organizing principle, particularly for so-called "failed
states" seeking reconstruction assistance from the international commu-
nity. For these states - often stricken by years of civil war, human
rights abuses, external intervention, and decimated infrastructures -
only a combination of peace among the warring factions, establishment
of democratic processes, guarantees of non-interference, and economic
aid can ensure that they may begin to function in a meaningful way as
autonomous political societies. This, at least, has been the United Na-
tions' working assumption in structuring its missions to South Africa,
Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador, and elsewhere. Internal
self-determination speaks to each of these remedial measures and sug-
gests that unless each is applied to dysfunctional states, they will contin-
ue on their self-destructive path. Thus, far from being drained of mean-
ing, internal self-determination for these states involves a multiplicity of
crucial meanings, each of which is essential to achieving true autonomy.
B. Advantages of an Internal Doctrine of Self-Determination
It is clearly an internal right's avoidance of legitimizing secessionist
claims that is responsible for its emergence. Other attempts to deal with
such claims systematically have largely failed: the international commu-
nity is not willing to recognize all groups claiming status as a self or to
attempt distinctions between claimants that, it recognizes, will inevitably
be regarded as arbitrary. An internal right allows the international com-
munity to discourage secession - as it did in the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia - while at the same time working actively to reverse the
exclusions from national political processes thought to produce much of
the disaffection manifest in secessionist claims.
universal realization of the right to self-determination," Mozambique's "establishment of
lasting peace and democracy." G.A. Res. 94, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/94 (1993). The resolution makes no mention of the numerous secessionist struggles
underway. In contrast to this parsimonious narrowing of self-determination, the Assembly is
becoming increasingly vocal in its statements concerning human rights generally. The
Assembly affirmed the "universality, objectivity and non-selectivity" of human rights, G.A.
Res. 125, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/125 (1993), and urged
"all States that have not yet done so to become parties to" the Political and Economic and
Social Covenants, and to the Optional Protocols to the former. G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/119 (1993).
107. FRANCK, supra note 48, at 50-66.
[Vol. 16:733
Spring 1995] Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era
The movement to an internal right is not without its costs. If it is
true that "[s]ecessionist demands, unlike claims about domestic political
fairness, cannot be satisfied through domestic political reforms, ' 10 8 then
secessionists may be seen as being disfavored in this attempted balanc-
ing of autonomy and territorial integrity. This perception may be partic-
ularly acute in cases where discrimination against the secessionists has
been longstanding and brutal. Some scholars who favor an internal right
have nonetheless concluded that in certain cases of acute discrimination
the doctrine may prove unjustly rigid and so have. argued that an "es-
cape hatch" of secession should be preserved in such extreme cases."
Leaving room for exceptional cases has undoubted appeal, and the
force of the argument for an "escape hatch" might be taken as an impor-
tant critique of the internal view. One may be certain that virtually all
secessionists will argue that their circumstances are "exceptional,"
leaving few cases subject to the general rule of territorial integrity. If
accepted, this critique leaves little room for the internal view to offer
outcomes that are both just and feasible: if no escape hatch is permitted,
then the most subjugated minorities are condemned to remain governed
by their oppressors; if escape in exceptional cases is permitted, every
case will become "exceptional," and the exception will swallow the rule.
The force of this argument may perhaps be blunted if one notes that
it would apply with equal force to virtually all conceptions of self-
determination that are not auto-defining. Formulae that attempt to distin-
guish among deserving "selves" on historical, demographic, or
geostrategic grounds will equally founder between the competing imper-
atives of doing justice to peoples and maintaining existing state bound-
aries. Any determination that one people's claim is more compelling
than another will be based on comparisons between historical injustices
that, while perhaps defensible in absolute terms, seem wholly arbitrary
as relative bases for distinctions: who can say whether one people has
"suffered more" than another?
The unique virtue of the internal view is that while in the short term
it may also produce cases with arguably unjust outcomes, it proposes a
conception of the state/self designed to remedy those injustices. This
capacity rests on a conceptual parity between national and international
systems so conceived. In Martti Koskenniemi's useful typology, the
internal view of an ordered, democratic political process accords with a
108. Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 177.
109. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Editorial Comment; The Degrees of Self-Determination in
the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304 (1994) ("[A] claim of a right to secede from
a repressive dictatorship may be regarded as legitimate.").
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juridical conception of the state system as a product of law rather than
of subjective cultural passions."' The juridical state suggests an ascer-
tainable, "agnostic" model of interstate relations which is controllable
because it owes both its existence and legitimacy to law. The U.N.
collective security system, which supplants the unilateral use of force as
a means of advancing national interests, is perhaps the best illustration
of an international community grounded in the rule of law."' If within
each state the political order is based not on a romantic sense of "au-
thentic community" but on an inclusive process of legal decisionmaking,
a similarly rule-based international community is on more secure ground
criticizing national orders that exclude or discriminate against minority
"peoples." Neither system allows itself to be redefined through extra-
legal claims of historic injustice, communal authenticity, or collective
destiny. But remedies do exist. In the case of secession, as with collec-
tive security, injustices are confronted systemically rather than ad hoc.
While denying secession, the internal view seeks to remedy the exclu-
sions from participation in national politics that give rise to secessionism
in the first place. "For this (liberal) view, the presence or absence of
those [inclusive political] procedures and their proper functioning is the
core of national self-determination. ' 2
There are, in addition, two further responses to the claim that an
internal view is unduly statist in its rejection of secessionism. The first
is that an internal right directly challenges the legitimacy of regimes
unresponsive to the opinions and diversity of their citizenries.
Exclusionary undemocratic regimes are, under this and other theories,
illegal under international law." 3 In declaring a regime illegal, an inter-
nal right becomes nearly as adversarial to the interests of states as a
right to secession permitting their dismemberment." 4 States, after all,
110. Koskenniemi, supra note 17, at 249-57.
111. On this issue, see Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of
War: "The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 63-66 (1991).
112. Koskenniemi, supra note 17, at 249.
113. For a more extended discussion of this question, see Gregory H. Fox, The Right to
Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 546-47, 596-97
(1992).
114. The case of South Africa is illustrative. The apartheid regime was condemned as
violating a preemptory norm of international law; effectively excluded from all multilateral
organizations; the subject of a multilateral arms embargo and numerous bilateral trade
embargoes; unable to carry on bilateral relations with most states in the world; and witness to
a declaration that its outlawed opposition groups were the "legitimate representatives of the
South African people" by the United Nations General Assembly. See JAN C. HEUNIS, UNITED
NATIONS VERSUS SOUTH AFRICA (1986). In sum, South Africa was unable to function as a
full member of the international community. Of course, not all declarations of regime
illegitimacy will or need to go this far. However, the principle of illegitimacy presents no
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function through their governments. When regimes both remove disabili-
ties placed on previously oppressed minority groups and subject them-
selves to popular scrutiny through elections, their survival is doubtful.
Not only are their own citizens likely to vote for change, but the inter-
national community is also increasingly willing to help structure elector-
al processes that may lead to incumbents' removal. Beigbeder certainly
demonstrates this to be true. Moreover, the U.N. Security Council has
on several occasions- deemed acts of domestic oppression to be a "threat
to the peace" and invoked the Charter's collective security apparatus in
response."' In demanding adherence to human rights norms in such
cases, the international community has sided with individuals and mi-
norities against their governments in the same way the General Assem-
bly sided with colonial peoples against their metropolitan rulers in
Resolution 1514 and its progeny.
Second, even if an internal right is regarded as serving primarily to
preserve existing state structures, such a choice is neither surprising nor
unusual; international law, made by and for states, has traditionally
favored principles of order over those derived from notions of justice."
6
This perspective is implicit in the uti possidetis principle, which rejects
justice-based claims concerning arbitrary boundaries, historic title, unjust
acquisition of territory, and forced migration of peoples (either into or
out of territories) in favor of the stability represented by a single "criti-
cal date." It is further implicit in the intertemporal law doctrine, by
operation of which the principles of self-determination and
nonacquisition of territory by force are not applied retroactively.1
7
Territorial conquests of the pre-Charter era are thus accepted as given
facts and may not serve as bases for appeals to contemporary norms. An
internal right, similarly cognizant of the impossibility of addressing such
justice-based claims in any manner that will be widely accepted, accepts
contemporary boundaries as immutable facts.
barriers to such an array of ostracisms and would perhaps even permit even more extreme
acts. The Security Council-sanctioned invasion of Haiti rested in no small degree on the
"illegal" usurpation of power by the military regime, which had nullified the effects of an
election the U.N. had itself monitored and pronounced "free and fair."
115. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (condemning
acts of the "illegal de facto regime" in Haiti); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (focussing on "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the
conflict in Somalia"); S.C. Res. 788, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Do. S/RES/788 (1992)
(brutality of civil war in Liberia).
116. See Jean Salmon, Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination: Towards a
Democratic Legitimacy Principle, in THE MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 256-57
(Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993). For a theoretical defense of this position, see FRANCK, supra
note 48, at 208-46.
•11'7. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 39.
Michigan Journal of International Law
II. WHO BELONGS TO THE TERRITORY?
The nature of an internal right is only partially clarified when the
"self' is held to coincide with the territorial state. In order for meaning-
ful consultation to occur, it must next be determined which individuals
belong to the territory. Only then can one ascribe real meaning to Judge
Dillard's oft-quoted restatement of the self-determination principle: "it is
for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the
territory the destiny of the people."" As an internal right gains accep-
tance, and questions of defining territory thereby recede, the focus on
the individuals constituting the "self' will take on an added importance.
In the international electoral activity Beigbeder surveys, this issue
arises most frequently as a question of voter eligibility. The body of
international law that has traditionally served as the gatekeeper for the
opportunity to vote is that regarding citizenship. Its relevance is made
clear by the Political Covenant, which in contrast to its guarantees of
other rights limits the right to political participation to "citizens. '"119 If
international law went no further than this and prescribed no criteria
regarding eligibility for citizenship, a country determined to limit its
electorate could easily do so without violating the Political Covenant's
prohibition on discriminatory treatment among citizens. It would simply
limit citizens to those likely to vote in its favor. International concern
over citizenship laws in the three Baltic republics arose precisely be-
cause of those laws' potential to disenfranchise substantial portions of
the populations. 2°
Traditional international law "leaves it to each State to lay down the
rules governing the grant of its own nationality. 12' The two most preva-
118. Id. at 122 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
119. Political Covenant, supra note 15, art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
120. In Estonia, for example, almost 40% of the population was not eligible to vote in
the September 1992 elections because persons of non-Estonian ethnicity were denied automat-
ic citizenship after independence from the Soviet Union. Under the revived 1938 citizenship
law, approximately 950,000 Estonian residents were considered citizens and approximately
600,000 considered foreigners. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, PRE-ELECTION SURVEY MISSION TO ESTONIA 17 (1992). See generally Andras
Fehervary, Citizenship, Statelessness and Human Rights: Recent Developments in the Baltic
States, 5 INT'L J. REF. L. 392 (1993).
121. Nottehbohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). This principle is repeated
in Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (1937), which provides that "[i]t is for each State to
determine under its own law who are its nationals." The Convention goes on to limit this
general principle, however, by stating that nationality laws shall be recognized by other states
only if they are "consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the
principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality." Only twenty states have
ratified the Convention.
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lent bases for granting nationality are jus solis (birth within the state)
and jus sanguinis (nationality of one or both parents)., The emergence
of an internal right to self-determination raises an important challenge to
this rule: if certain crucial aspects of the processes by which states
determine their political future are now questions of international human
rights law, may a state legally manipulate participation in those process-
es for political purposes? That is, may large numbers of people be
included in or excluded from an electorate based on considerations other
than jus solis or jus sanguinis? While there has been no explicit chal-
lenge to the broad rule of state discretion in granting nationality, recent
international practice, roughly divisible into two broad categories, sug-
gests that increasingly they may not.123
A. Affirmative Norms
In two peacekeeping missions of the post-Cold War era, the United
Nations has been granted plenary authority to determine the eligibility
criteria for voting in national elections.'2' Beigbeder extensively canvass-
es these two ground-breaking operations but unfortunately devotes
almost no attention to the eligibility question. 125 The first mission was
that of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to
Namibia. The framework for voter eligibility in Namibia was set by
Security Council Resolution 435 of September 29, 1978, which charged
UNTAG with a mandate to "ensure the early independence of Namibia
through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the
United Nations."' 26 The five nation Western "Contact Group" which had
precipitated UNTAG's creation supplemented Resolution 435 in 1982
with a set of Constitutional Principles, that provided that "[e]very adult
Namibian" would be eligible to vote. 7
122. RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
32-33 (2d ed. 1994).
123. See id. at 154-59; 175-77.
124. The U.N. mission to monitor the referendum on self-determination in the Western
Sahara is currently stalled on precisely this question of voter eligibility. Report of the Secre-
tary-General: The Situation Concerning, Western Sahara, U.N. Doc. S/1994/283, at 6-9
(1994). Morocco, which occupied the territory shortly after the International Court handed
down its advisory opinion in 1975, has attempted to inflate the voter rolls through inclusion
of persons not present in the territory at the time of the last census. Because the question is as
yet unresolved, I do not consider the Western Sahara operation as a precedent on this issue. If
the Moroccan view prevails, however, and a substantial number of persons neither born nor
resident in the territory becomes eligible to vote on the territory's future, U.N. practice will
take a significant turn away from the norms represented by the Namibia and Cambodia
operations.
125. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 151-63 (Namibia); 197-212 (Cambodia).
126. S.C. Res. 435, U.N. SCOR, 33d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/435 (1978).
127. Letter from the Representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America
to the Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., Annex, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/15287 (1982).
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How precisely to define an "adult Namibian" produced a lively
debate among the parties, primarily between SWAPO (the largest party
and ultimate victor in the election) and the South African authorities,
which under Resolution 435 retained administrative control over the
territory. SWAPO and some outside observers argued that the many
Namibian refugees living in adjacent countries, often for decades, should
be permitted to vote. Further, they opposed the large numbers of white
South Africans claiming permanent residence in the territory based only
on a short civil service posting or other tenuous connection. 2 ' South
Africa, on the other hand, expressed concern that, along with repatriated
refugees, SWAPO would arrange for the registration of large numbers of
Angolan Ovambos "who are linguistically and otherwise indistinguish-
able from the members of the same population living in Namibia on the
other side of an ill-marked and easily crossed border."' 29 Both sides
were concerned over the implications of registering persons in Walvis
Bay, a South African enclave whose status had specifically been left
undecided by the Security Council.
130
The final formula took account of these concerns, and in general
attempted to restrict registration to actual permanent residents of
Namibia. On June 30, 1989, the Administrator-General declared eligible
any 18-year old who was (i) born in Namibia; (ii) ordinarily resident in
Namibia as of the date of registration and had been so for an immediate
prior period of four years; or (iii) the natural child of a person born in
Namibia. Those seconded to the territory for service in the South Afri-
can government could qualify as "ordinary residents" if, in addition to
meeting the normal criteria, they swore an intention to remain in the
territory after it became an independent state. Residents of Walvis Bay
were permitted to register if they had been born in Namibia proper.'
Wholly excluded from these criteria were issues of race or ethnicity;
connection to the territory was the defining characteristic. Disguised
ethnic criteria, such as might appear if connection to the territory over
many generations was required, was also excluded by permitting even
128. See Paul C. Szasz, The Electoral Process, in THE NAMIBIAN PEACE PROCESS:
IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 144 (Herbert Weiland & Matthew Braham eds.,
1994); NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, NATION BUILDING:
THE U.N. AND NAMIBIA 30 (1990) [hereinafter NATION BUILDING]; REPORT OF THE FIRST
OBSERVER MISSION OF THE COMMISSION ON INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA 27-28 (1989).
129. Szasz, supra note 128, at 144.
130. NATION BUILDING, supra note 128, at 30. Pending final disposition of the matter,
South Africa and Namibia agreed to a joint administration of Walvis Bay in October 1992.
Under the agreement, residents retained their prior citizenship. Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of Namibia and the Government of the Republic of South Africa
on the Joint Administration of Walvis Bay and the Off-Shore Islands, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1152 (1993).
131. AG Proclamation No. 19, Extraordinary Official Gazette of South West Africa No.
5740, at 4-5 (June 30, 1989).
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first generation Namibians to vote. The prescriptive value of the
Namibian experience was enhanced by two factors. First, a draft version
of the voter registration law was circulated for a comment period prior
to its official promulgation. After some seventy organizations submitted
comments, extensive changes were made in the draft law, including
adding the requirement that civil servants swear their intention to remain
in an independent Namibia. 132 A large number of highly critical human
rights organizations thus had input into the final content of the law.
Second, the Security Council demanded in Resolution 640 that all
proclamations issued during the UNTAG operation "conform with
internationally accepted norms for the conduct of free and fair elec-
tions." 133 The Secretary-General's Special Representative in Namibia,
apparently satisfied that the voter registration law fulfilled this criterion,
certified that this and all other aspects of the electoral process had been
free and fair.'3
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
faced much stronger pressure to disassociate voters from territory.
Virtually all the political factions in Cambodia exerted intense pressure
on the U.N. to ensure that ethnic Vietnamese were excluded from the
voter rolls. 135 Most adamant were the Khmer Rouge, who regularly
threatened and carried out violent attacks on so-called "Vietnamese
settlers" in Cambodia. 136 The legal framework for voter registration was
set initially by the 1991 Paris Accords, which enfranchised all eighteen
year olds either born in Cambodia or the child of a person born in
Cambodia.1 37 This formulation, while reflecting some ethnic sensitivity
in its exclusion of Vietnamese nationals who entered the country after
the Vietnamese invasion in 1979, remained centered on links to the
territory. Those born to Vietnamese parents in Vietnam would be ex-
cluded, but those born to Cambodian refugee parents, or who were
132. NATION BUILDING, supra note 128, at 30.
133. S.C. Res. 640, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/640 (1989).
134. NATION BUILDING, supra note 128, at 63-64.
135. Reginald Austin, Director of UNTAC's Electoral Component, remarked he had
"discovered that there is a very deep concern among all Cambodians with the possibility of
persons whom they regard as foreigners being able to register to vote and to swamp the
electoral roll." An Interview with the Chief Electoral Officer, ELECTORAL COMPONENT
NEWSLETTER, Aug. 21, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter ELECTORAL NEWSLETrER](on file with author);
see also Sara Colin, Factions, UNTAC Debate Electoral Law, PHNOM PENH POST, July 10,
1992, at 1 (collected anti-Vietnamese remarks of various party representatives).
136. Nate Thayer, Fighting Words, FAR EAST ECON. REV., Aug. 20, 1992, at 8-9; Third
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia, U.N. Doc. S/25124, at 21 (1993) [hereinafter Third Report].
137. Agreement On a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct.
23, 1991, Annex 3, para. 4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 183, 197 (1992) [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement].
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refugees themselves, would be eligible to vote.1 38 The Paris Accords
vested final authority to approve the electoral laws in the Secretary-
General's Special Representative in Cambodia.
39
As soon as the UNTAC operation began, however, the Special
Representative came under intense pressure from the Cambodian parties
to narrow the Paris criteria. In April 1992, UNTAC produced a draft
electoral law which faithfully tracked the previously agreed-upon crite-
ria. Most members of the Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC)
objected, arguing that the law ought explicitly to disenfranchise ethnic
Vietnamese, regardless of the difficulties involved in distinguishing a
group that had lived in Cambodia for generations.14° The Khmer Rouge
member of the SNC dismissed the draft law as giving "a rubber stamp
to the Vietnamese occupation of our country.' 41
The pressure had some effect, as the draft law was revised to require
stronger family ties to the territory. The final law, promulgated on
August 12, 1992, enfranchised all eighteen year olds who were (i) born
in Cambodia to at least one parent born in Cambodia; or (ii) born
elsewhere with at least one Cambodian parent and grandparent. 42 This
formulation altered the Paris Accords by adding one generation of
linkage for those born in Cambodia and two generations for those born
abroad. Still, there are a number of reasons for regarding the final law
as substantially less than a full capitulation to an ethnically defined
electorate. First, the group of greatest concern to the Cambodian parties
- Vietnamese who moved into the country after the 1979 invasion -
would not have been permitted to vote under the Paris criteria in any
case, assuming such persons were born in Vietnam to Vietnamese
parents. Second, UNTAC rejected a Khmer Rouge proposal to apply
purely ethnic criteria by extending the franchise to the so-called Khmer
Krom - ethnic Cambodians born or with a parent born in southern
Vietnam. 43 The Secretary-General responded that "the extension of the
franchise on purely ethnic grounds to persons who were not born in
138. See Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
19-20 (1993).
139. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 137, art. 13 and Annex 1 § D(l).
140. Colim, supra note 135, at 1. The Khmer Rouge, for example, wanted the franchise
restricted to Cambodian citizens over age 18 with one parent who was a Cambodian citizen
prior to January 1979. Anuraj Manibhandu, K. Rouge Give Indications They Won't Join Poll,
BANGKOK POST, Aug. 14, 1992, at 2.
141. Kevin Barrington, Samphan Threatens Violence Over Electoral Law, CAMBODIA
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at 1.
142. Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transition-
al Authority in Cambodia, U.N. Doc. S/24578, at 3-4 (1992).
143. Third Report, supra note 136, at 7-8; Ratner, supra note 138, at 39 & n.239.
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Cambodia would not be consistent with the letter or the spirit of the
Paris Agreements."' 144 This decision was in keeping with UNTAC's
consistent refusal to make open concessions to ethnicity in other stages
of the electoral process.1 45 Implicit ethnic criteria, it appears, were
tolerated only to the extent necessary to keep the entire electoral process
from collapsing.46 Finally, UNTAC did not insist on formal documenta-
ry evidence in establishing whether a person met the Electoral Law's
requirements: in the event of a dispute over a potential voter's family
history, UNTAC decided to permit registration if two other registered
voters swore to the person's qualifications. 47 In the end, the Cambodian
electoral law neither disenfranchised large groups within Cambodia who
had longstanding connections to the territory nor enfranchised ethnic
Cambodians outside its borders with few permanent ties.
In both the Namibian and Cambodian missions, the United Nations
exercised plenary authority over the criteria for voter eligibility. If for
this reason they can be taken as expressing at least nascent international
standards, important affirmative criteria are apparent for who must be
included in an electorate. Both enfranchised persons born in a territory
with a parent born there; and both enfranchised those born outside the
territory with a grandparent born in the territory. Both add one genera-
tion to the jus solis and jus sanguinis standards, but given the nature of
the two operations, such a deviation is not unreasonable. Both territories
were emerging from years of bitter conflict to an uncertain future as
independent states. The elections were watershed events in this
transformative process. That participation in the elections should be
restricted to those persons who had, by virtue of long-standing family
ties, weathered the worst years of conflict, is understandable. But more
importantly, it is a standard that focuses on the links between persons
and territory in defining the electoral self.
48
144. Third Report, supra note 136, at 8.
145. In instructions to its registration workers, UNTAC stated: "The [Electoral] Law
does not define a Cambodian person in terms of a person's ethnic origin, and no person can
be refused registration merely because of his or her ethnic background if he or she falls
within the definition of 'Cambodian person' set out in the Law." UNTAC, REGISTRATION
PROCEDURES MANUAL, PART I 11 (Sept. 1992).
146. Electoral Component Director Austin explained that in responding to pressure from
the parties to make ethnicity explicit, UNTAC had "discussed possible ways of defining a
'Cambodian,' the term that the Cambodian parties wanted to be used, which would meet this
problem but also meet the standards that the United Nations must itself uphold." ELECTORAL
NEWSLETTER, supra note 135, at 2.
147. UNTAC, supra note 145, at 16.
148. Additionally, the Security Council in recommending a settlement plan for the long-
standing dispute in Cyprus has called for a solution "based on a State of Cyprus with a single
sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship." S.C. Res. 939, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/939 (1994).
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B. Negative Norms
Reinforcing the norms emerging from U.N. practice as to who
should be included in an electorate are a series of unconnected yet
mutually reinforcing prohibitions against various sorts of exclusions
from an electorate. These norms address both policies intended to disen-
franchise groups or individuals and actions that have the effect of doing
so. Taken together, they present a significant challenge to states' tradi-
tional discretion to define their electorates as they see fit.
1. Exclusions Based on Racial Criteria
The host of treaties, resolutions and unilateral actions directed
against apartheid have been based, at core, on the unacceptable exclu-
sion of black citizens from participating in choosing their governments.
In 1992, for example, the General Assembly affirmed the legitimacy of
"the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa" to establish a
society "in which all the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective
of race, colour or creed, will enjoy equal and full political and other
rights and participate freely in the determination of their destiny."'
' 49
Groups assumed to represent the majority of South African people had
long been recognized as those people's "authentic representatives."'o5
Also in 1992, the Assembly declared that a satisfactory solution to the
South African problem would occur only upon "the establishment of a
non-racial, democratic society based on majority rule, through the full
and free exercise of adult suffrage."' 5' The holding of all-race elections
on April 27, 1994 achieved that goal and led the U.N. immediately to
repeal all previously imposed sanctions and to allow South Africa to
participate in the work of U.N. organs for the first time in twenty
years. 
52
The international community's successful eradication of apartheid
represents an important limitation on the Nottebohm principle: states
cannot limit participation in their political processes through race-based
exclusions. This is true both for persons of color who hold nominal
citizenship but who are denied crucial political rights accorded to white
149. G.A. Res. 130, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 47th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/130
(1992).
150. G.A. Res. 6(I), supra note 41, at 12.
151. G.A. Res. 130, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 47th Sess., at 353, 354, U.N. Doc.
A/47/678/Add. 2 (1992).
152. South African Vote is First in Twenty Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at A6; S.C.
Res. 919, supra note 98 (inter alia terminating 1977 arms embargo).
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citizens and for residents of the state denied citizenship altogether. This
second category derives from the international community's overwhelm-
ing refusal to recognize the South African "homelands," to which resi-
dents were deemed to have transferred their citizenship from the South
African state. 53 Such persons were, in effect, deemed to hold a human
right to continue as South African citizens and participate in the political
life of the nation on an equal footing with white citizens.
154
2. Inclusion and Exclusion Accomplished by
Forced Movement of Peoples
A government may manipulate an electorate in two ways through
large scale forced movement of peoples. First, it can prevent certain
groups from participating in a vote by displacing them within their
country or by expelling them altogether from the territory. "Ethnic
cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzegovina - which has created an almost
entirely homogenous Serbian zone in seventy percent of the state whose
residents have voted to reject internationally mediated peace plans - is
an example of such forced expulsions. Second, a government may force
large groups into the territory in order to "stack" voter rolls. This has
been the Moroccan tactic in the Western Sahara, beginning with the so-
called "Green March" in 1975.155
Both such forms of coercion are directly contrary to international
standards regarding freedom of movement, which concern not only the
freedom to remain in the state of one's nationality but also to choose the
place of one's residence within that state.1 56 The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, for example, provides that "[e]veryone
lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the ... freedom to choose his residence."' 57 Thus, persons "of different
races, religions, or political belief cannot be required to live in designat-
153. E.g., S.C. Res. 407, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/407 (1977); S.C. Res.
402, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/402 (1976); G.A. Res. 6A, U.N. GAOR 31st
Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 10, U.N. Do. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 105, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess.,
Supp. No. 45, at 30, U.N. Doe. A/32/45 (1977).
154. The President of the Security Council stated on behalf of its Members that the
homelands policy "seeks to create a class of foreign people in their own country." U.N.
SCOR, 34th Sess., 2315th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doe. S/14794 (1981); see also DUGARD, supra
note 29, at 107-08.
155. In 1979 the General Assembly "deeply deplored the aggravation of the situation
resulting from the continued occupation of the Western Sahara by Morocco." The Assembly
also referred to the POLISARIO as "the representative of the people of the Western Sahara."
G.A. Res. 37, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doe. A/RES/34/37 (1979).
156. See generally Ved R Nanda, International Law and the Refugee Challenge: Mass
Expulsion and Internally Displaced People, 28 WILLAMETrE L. Rev. 791 (1992).
157. Political Covenant, supra note 15, art. 12(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
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ed areas."' 8 The Covenant goes on to protect against arbitrary expul-
sions: "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country."'59 The Covenant does permit restrictions on these rights
which are "consistent with the other rights recognized" in the instru-
ment 60 An attempt to manipulate an election through forced movement
of peoples, however, would hardly be consistent with a treaty that
guarantees the right to vote in "genuine" elections.
161
3. Murdering Potential Voters
The most brutal manipulation of an election would involve a regime
engaged in mass killings of its political opponents. Such an act clearly
violates the human right to life, 62 as well as the Genocide Convention,
if the killing is undertaken with the intention of destroying a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group in whole or in part.
63
4. Disenfranchisement Through Electoral Fraud
Elections can be manipulated in both blatant and subtle ways that
may deprive a particular group of effective participation in the process
of choosing national leaders. Conventional law addresses electoral fraud
in broad terms, 164 while an increasing number of particular elections
158. Stig Jagerskiold, Freedom of Movement, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
166, 176 (Louis Henkin ed. 1981).
159. Political Covenant, supra note 15, art. 12(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176; see also Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. for
Sept. 21-Dec. 12, 1948, at 71, 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("1. Everyone has the right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. 2. Everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."); American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22(5), O.E.A. T.S. No. 36, at 8, 9 I.L.M.
673, 682 ("No one can be expelled from the territory of the state of which he is a national or
be deprived of the right to enter it."); Protocol IV to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 16, 1963, arts 2-3, 7 I.L.M.
978, 978-79 (1968) ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the ... freedom to choose his residence. No one shall be expelled, by means
either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he
is a national.").
160. Political Covenant, supra note 15, art. 12(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
161. Id. art. 25(b), at 179.
162. Id. art. 6, at 174; American Convention, supra note 159, art. 4, O.E.A. T.S. No. 36,
at 2; Protocol IV, supra note 159, art. 2, 7 I.L.M. at 978; Universal Declaration, supra note
159, art. 3, at 72.
163. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
164. See Political Covenant, supra note 15, art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179; American
Convention, supra note 159, art. 23(1)(b), O.E.A. T.S. No. 36, at 8; Protocol (No.1) to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, 213
U.N.T.S. 262, 264; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13(1), OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 59, 61; International Convention on the Elimination of all
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have been subject to scrutiny by U.N. monitoring missions.165 Many
commentators now regard this practice as supporting an emerging norm
of free and fair elections. 166 Subsumed under this general heading are
prohibitions on acts such as instituting a one party state, disrupting
campaigns, restricting access to mass media, and outright ballot fraud. 167
Each such tactic results in the effective disenfranchisement of affected
voters. The emerging consensus condemning tainted elections seeks as
its goal to achieve "some consistency between the will of the voters and
the result of the election."'6
III. RECENT ELECTORAL PRACTICE AND SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Democracy and Self-Determination
If one accepts these arguments for an emerging internal right to self-
determination, Beigbeder's book provides a wealth of supporting data.
His survey of monitoring by the United Nations, regional organizations,
and an NGO community only recently taking an interest in electoral
matters provides a detailed review of all important missions since the
First World War. The conceptual bridge between this history and the
notion of an internal right must be provided by the reader, however.
Beigbeder is not a theorist; his dense recitations of fact are generally
introduced with broad labels and do not seem to progress in anything
other than chronological order. The relationship between monitoring
internal elections and the broad principle of self-determination is assert-
ed but not explored. 69 The closest Beigbeder comes to a conceptual
analysis is to restate the contemporary dilemma without elaboration in
unhelpfully basic terms: "[i]f self-determination is an internationally
recognized principle, why does it not apply to the people of West Irian,
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, art. 5(c), 660 U.N.T.S.
195, 220 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, art. 1, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, 135 (entered into force July 7,
1954).
165. Report of the Secretary-General: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Periodic and Genuine Elections, U.N. Doc. A/47/668 (1992); Report of the Secretary-Gener-
al: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, U.N. Doc.
A/46/609 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Election Report].
166. See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1, 2 n.3 (1995).
167. Id. at 4-5; Fox, supra note 113, at 555-60.
168. Mexico Elections Decision, Cases 9768, 9780, 9828, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 97, 108
OEA/ser. LJV/1 1.77, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1990).
169. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 18.
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East Timor, Tibet, Kashmir and other territories, as it has been applied
to trust and other colonial territories?"'' 70
Beigbeder's writing style does not help matters. Some passages are
collections of one sentence paragraphs, often extending for several
pages. 7' Others are expressed in an odd, sometimes ungrammatical
phraseology.' 72 Political theories on the nature of democracy are present-
ed as lists of factors and are not related to the discussion of practice that
follows. 173 When Beigbeder does venture a theory of democratic transi-
tions it comes across as a quasi-Hegelian notion of Ideas marching
through history: "[t]he democratic ideology and practices have taken
centuries to develop in the Western countries: the evolution had to
weaken and then defeat despots, absolute monarchs and emperors,
military rulers, religious imperialism."'
' 74
The most obvious bridge between self-determination and internal
democracy is majoritarianism. Beigbeder states but does not explore this
connection. 75 He repeats the Security Council's description of the
Cambodian national. elections as an act of self-determination, 76 but
several pages later contrasts missions to observe acts of self-determina-
tion with "pro-democracy operations.' 77 One obvious problem with the
common bond of majoritarianism is that in polarized, multi-ethnic, or
multi-racial states the goals of autonomy and self-government fostered
by colonial-era self-determination may only be partly realized through
democratic elections. Minorities, by definition, may not benefit. This
problem is avoided by a more comprehensive definition of democracy,
which includes not only majoritarian decisionmaking but anti-
majoritarian protections for those for whom the normal political process
may offer no assistance. However, Beigbeder fluctuates radically
throughout the book between a narrowly majoritarian and a more robust,
rights-based conception of democracy. Early in the book he follows
170. Id. at 145.
171. See, e.g., id. at 52, 206.
172. For example, a General Assembly resolution "did not express relief nor satisfac-
tion." Id. at 198. Or the following: "[t]he withdrawals from the League of Japan and Germany
in 1933, from Italy in 1937 and from Spain in 1939, were not due principally .... Id. at 77.
Or several passages in which ellipses appear at the end of sentences that are not quotations.
Id. at 191, 199. Or his description of political upheaval in Mongolia as "manifestations." Id.
at 6.
173. E.g., id. at 54 (listing another author's "seven basic elements of the fascist out-
look").
174. Id. at 43.
175. See id. at 18.
176. Id. at 212; see S.C. Res. 745, supra note 96.
177. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 218.
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Joseph Schumpeter 171 (although attributing the view to Samuel Hunting-
ton)179 in a procedural conception of democracy, describing its "main
tenet" as the proposition "that government shall rest on the consent of
the governed, that consent, or dissent, being expressed at free and
periodical elections."' 80 Through much of the rest of the book, however,
Beigbeder measures the "democratic" nature of regimes by their overall
respect for human rights, especially those of, minority or dissident
groups. 181
As the previous discussion has suggested, a Schumpeterian proce-
dural view of democracy provides only a weak link to internal self-
determination. Pure majoritarianism was clearly appropriate in cases of
external self-determination, such as decolonization, where consideration
of minority views might have easily lead to an infinite regression of
smaller and smaller units detaching themselves from parent states. But
an internal doctrine concerns not the control of one territory by another
but the constitutional makeup of a single territorial "self." In a single
polity, pure majoritarianism will by definition exclude some citizens
from the decisionmaking process, thus making the consultation at the
core of self-determination incomplete. One need not go as far as adopt-
ing a purely deontological, rights-based conception of democracy to
close this gap. John Ely's notion of minority rights as enhancing partici-
pation in the majoritarian process embraces an inclusive view of the
entire "self' without wholly abandoning elections as the central means
of participation.'82 The point, which Beigbeder's unfocused definition of
democracy obscures, is that only a theory of democracy that takes into
account the concerns of all individual components of state-based "self'
is convincing as a species of self-determination.
8 3
B. Emerging Electoral Norms
This critique of Beigbeder is in one sense unfair: he has not, after
all, written a book addressing all the human rights norms conceivably
178. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (2d ed.
1947).
179. In a book written after the essay cited by Beigbeder, Huntingon explicitly adopts
Schempeter's conception of democracy as essentially procedural. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE
THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 6-7 (1991).
180. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 20.
181. E.g., id. at 22-23, 62, 99.
182. JOHN HAT ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
183. Thus, when a state precludes effective participation, it denies its people their right
to self-determination. Acts such as mass electoral fraud, anti-democratic coups, or persecution
of minority groups constitute violations of a people's collective right to determine by whom
it is ruled.
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fitting under the umbrella of "democratic" government. On the other
hand, Beigbeder himself consistently defines democracy as the respect
for a broad panoply of civil and political rights. Despite this ongoing
terminological confusion, the book is nonetheless rich in information on
the growing international practice of monitoring elections, which in
most theoretical conceptions functions as the foundation of democratic
governance.
Beigbeder aptly chronicles the slow ascendence of election monitor-
ing from occupying a marginal comer of international conflict resolution
to its role as high-profile guarantor of an emerging human right to
participation in national political affairs. Election monitoring began as a
sporadic practice in the nineteenth century, most notably in connection
with Italian unification. 184 The first multinational efforts of any conse-
quence took place after the First World War pursuant to the Treaties of
Versailles and Saint-Germain. Wilson's enthusiasm for the concept of
self-determination was clearly the inspiration for the relevant treaty
provisions, but his rhetoric far outstripped eventual practice. Before the
Versailles Conference, Wilson proclaimed that the settlement of every
territorial question would be founded "on the basis of the free accep-
tance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned."'85 At
virtually the same time, however, he had entrusted a team of historians,
ethnologists, and cartographers (headed by the young Walter Lippman)
with the task of redrawing the map of Europe to redistribute the ethnic
groups newly emancipated from the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
Empires.18 6 The final territorial settlements were based largely on Allied
views of appropriate ethnic arrangements, with substantial weight given
to concerns that the newly created states remain sufficiently small and
dispersed to pose no strategic threat. 87 Only five plebiscites were even-
tually held in small, relatively marginal areas.
That the Allies' post-war reconfiguration of Europe took little
account of the views of peoples affected is hardly surprising: the peace
treaties neither embodied a coherent view of self-determination nor
established an international mechanism to supervise disposition of the
territories concerned. The emergence of a successful monitoring regime
in the era of decolonization may in large part be attributed to the pres-
184. See SARAH WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCITES WITH A COLLECTION OF
DOCUMENTS 58-169 (1920).
185. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 80 (quoting WAMBAUGH, supra note 184, at 11).
186. RONALD STEEL, WALTER LIPPMAN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 128-40 (1980).
187. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27-29
(1990).
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ence of these two factors in the United Nations system. Spurred by
seminal General Assembly resolutions, the U.N. (and in particular the
Trusteeship Council) observed thirty elections, referenda, and plebiscites
in non-self-governing and trust territories between 1956 and 1990.18 Not
all former colonies held votes on independence or had international
monitors present at their first post-independence elections. But the
ubiquity of supervision lent an important orderliness to many such
transitions, particularly those in territories with potentially explosive
ethnic tensions such as British and French Togolands'89 (later Togo,
Ghana and Benin) and Ruanda-Urundi' 90 (later Rwanda and Burundi).
Perhaps most importantly in normative terms, the colonial-era missions
established a repertoire of electoral practices which gave content to the
then inchoate notion of a "free and fair" election.' 91
The United Nations did not begin monitoring elections in indepen-
dent states until after the process of decolonization was largely complet-
ed. Early in its history the U.N. had attempted monitoring in Korea and
Germany, with Cold War tensions leading to predictably unsatisfactory
results. 92 The watershed came with the highly successful mission to
Namibia (UNTAG), which capped over thirty years of international
efforts to oust South Africa from the territory. The Namibian operation
was ground-breaking in several respects. First, it was the Security Coun-
cil that established the legal framework for Namibian independence by
declaring it "imperative that free elections under the supervision and
control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one
political entity." 93 Second, to many observers South Africa's continued
administrative control over the territory during the campaign and elec-
tion, as well as outbreaks of fighting between South African and
SWAPO forces, raised severe doubts as to whether the final results
would be accepted by both sides. 194 Yet voting occurred with virtually
no violence and a peaceful transition of power took place several
188. 1991 Election Report, supra note 165, at 27-28. The list of missions is reprinted in
BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 98.
189. See Report of the United Nations Commission for the Supervision of the Elections in
Togoland under French Administration, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Annex 1, Addendum to
Agenda Item 40, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3957 (1958); The Future of Togoland Under British
Administration: Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, U.N. TCOR, 18th
Sess., 733rd mtg. at 279, U.N. Doe. T/1258 (1956).
190. Report of the United Nations Commissioner for Ruanda-Urundi, U.N. GAOR, 16th
Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 49, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/4994 (1961).
191. See Fox, supra note 113, at 587-96.
192. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 120-26.
193. S.C. Res. 385, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doe. S/RES/385 (1976).
194. See COMMISSION ON INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA, REPORT OF THE FIRST OBSERVER
MISSION OF THE COMMISSION ON INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA (1989).
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months later.'95 Third, the devisive ethnic politics practiced by South
Africa during its years of occupation required, in the words of one
UNTAG official, "that the holding of elections in Namibia which would
be more than only superficially free and fair would require massive
intervention by UNTAG to change the political climate in the coun-
try.' 96 Substantial social engineering, in other words, as opposed to
mere passive observation, was required to ensure a successful transition.
To overcome these and other obstacles UNTAG deployed over
8,000 persons in the territory - an enormous U.N. undertaking by the
standards of 1989 - and insisted that it be involved in every step of
implementing the new framework of electoral laws, which it had also
painstakingly negotiated with the South African Administrator-Gener-
al.' 97 UNTAG also organized a massive public relations campaign
designed to convince Namibians both that the elections would be con-
ducted fairly and that the results would be respected. 98 Soon after the
elections the newly elected Namibian Constituent Assembly drafted a
remarkably progressive constitution, 99 which it adopted with much
ceremony less than one week prior to formal independence.2"
The Namibian operation produced an enormous sense of optimism
in the U.N. Coinciding as it did with the end of the Cold War, the
operation's success not only represented for many an emerging consen-
sus on the value of democratic governance (previously, even the word
"democracy" rarely appeared in official U.N. documents) but also pre-
sented important evidence of the organization's capacity to establish
democratic processes in states torn by conflict and mistrust. Namibia
thus served as an important catalyst for further large scale,
transformative U.N. operations in which democratization played an
increasingly central role. In the next several years, such operations
followed one on the heels of another.
195. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 161-63.
196. Cederic Thomberry, The Secretary-General and Namibia 7 (1991) (paper presented
to Ralph Bunche Institute conference on "The Impact of the Changing International Climate
on the Role of the United Nations' Secretary-General" held on Sept. 11-13, 1991)(on file
with author).
197. Szasz, supra note 128, at 143.
198. 1991 Election Report, supra note 165, at 9.
199. For example, the constitution provides that its extensive protections of civil and
political rights cannot be altered or removed by amendment. NAMIB. CONST. arts. 131,
132(5)(a). In addition, unless otherwise specified "the general rules of public international law
and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form part of
the law of Namibia." Id. art. 144. On the latter issue, see Gerald Erasmus, The Namibian
Constitution and the Application of International Law, 15 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 81
(1989/90).
200. Szasz, supra note 128, at 250.
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The next mission was the ONUVEN operation in Nicaragua, which
the Secretary-General authorized even before the Namibian elections had
taken place. The elections culminated a regional effort to resolve the
contra war that had engulfed Nicaragua and its neighbors since the early
1980s. ONUVEN had none of the leverage with the Nicaraguan govern-
ment that UNTAG was able to muster when negotiating with the South
African electoral authorities. Yet, remarkably, it was able to persuade
the Sandinista government both to alter laws and cease practices that it
found inconsistent with the mission mandate.2°' That mandate might
have been interpreted to cast ONUVEN as mere passive observer, but
Elliot Richardson, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in
Nicaragua, argued that ONUVEN's unique ability to legitimize the
elections "demanded more than merely recording the process, more than
monitoring, and could not stop short of actively seeking to get corrected
whatever substantial defects and been discovered." 2 That the incumbent
government lost the election and proceded to leave office (although not
without substantial controversy) further reinforced the perceived value of
a U.N. presence.
Still more ground was broken in the Haiti operation, authorized by
the General Assembly only seven months after the elections in Nicara-
gua. Both the Namibian and Nicaraguan elections were part of solutions
to conflicts long of concern to the international community; both, for
example, had been the subject of opinions by the ICJ. 203 In September
1990, the Secretary-General attempted to codify this practice by an-
nouncing that henceforth, large scale U.N. election monitoring would be
restricted to situations in which a "clear international dimension" was
present.' One month later, however, the General Assembly approved
the mission to Haiti. The only "international dimension" to Haiti's
ongoing political crisis was a steady outflow of refugees, a factor pres-
ent in virtually all purely internal crises. 205 After Haiti, the requirement
201. First Report of the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process
in Nicaragua to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/44/642 (1989), at 6.
202. Fifth Report of the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process
in Nicaragua to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/44/927 (1990), at 3.
203. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July 11); Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 6 (Jan. 26); Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
204. Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/45/1
(1990), at 15 [hereinafter 1990 Report].
205. In a subsequent report the Secretary-General remarked with typically oblique
understatement that "the case of Haiti differed from that of Nicaragua in that the international
dimension of the case was less evident." 1990 Report, supra note 204, at 15.
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of an international nexus has faded from official commentary on U.N.
electoral activities.'
This universalization of monitoring as appropriate to virtually all
national elections has led to the establishment of an elaborate infrastruc-
ture - both at the U.N. level and elsewhere - designed to promote
democratic transitions.0 7 Ironically, the very failure to limit U.N. opera-
tions to situations with a "clear international dimension" has reinforced
the centrality of monitored elections to crises which are undoubtedly of
interest to the international community - in particular efforts to resolve
protracted civil wars. For if societies at peace are now expected to
include their citizens in choosing leaders and devising national policy,
then such processes are surely necessary in states in which divisiveness
and exclusion are ongoing problems still to be remedied. °s
Thus, less than one month after the value of the Haiti operation
seemed to disappear when the Haitian military overthrew President
Aristide, nineteen states initiated by treaty the largest U.N. electoral
mission to date. The Paris Accords on Cambodia went far beyond
Namibia in the degree of control over the process ceded to the U.N. All
Cambodian "administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could
directly influence the outcome of the election" were placed under direct
UNTAC supervision. 209 The U.N. was thereby granted effective control
over Cambodia's "foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public
206. Even in what has become an annual General Assembly resolution serving as a
counterpoint to resolutions praising monitoring activities, the Assembly did not single out this
factor as dispositive in decisions to provide electoral assistance. Rather, according to this
resolution, the "special circumstances" meriting assistance include "cases of decolonization, in
the context of regional or international peace prcesses or at the request of specific sovereign
States, [or] by virtue of resolutions adopted by the Security Council or the General Assem-
bly." Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the Internal
Affairs of States in Their Electoral Processes, G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/49/180 (1994). Moreover, in the Forty-Ninth Session, fifty-seven Member States
voted against this resolution, whereas only one member state (Iran) voted against a parallel
pro-election resolution. See Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the
Effectiveness of Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization, G.A.
Res. 190, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/190 (1994).
207. Beigbeder briefly describes the creation of the first U.N. body dedicated to electoral
matters - the Electoral Assistance Unit - in 1992. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 115-16.
Upon its creation, the Unit was in such demand that it was soon upgraded to a "Division" of
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Beigbeder has a much more extensive review of
electoral activities by regional organizations and nongovernmental organizations, two groups
often neglected in the literature on democratic transitions.
208. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has repeatedly sounded this theme in speaking of
"post-conflict peace-building." Report of the Secretary-General: An Agenda for Peace, U.N.
Doc. A/47/277 & S/24111 (1992), at 16-17; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace:
One Year Later, ORBIS, Summer 1993, at 323, 328-30.
209. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 200.
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security and information. ''20 All aspects of the elections themselves
were under UNTAC's direct control. The recalcitrance of the Khmer
Rouge and the apprehension that greeted election day in Cambodia are
well documented. Perhaps because of such pessimism the success of the
voting itself - with an over ninety percent turn-out rate, even in areas
in which Khmer Rouge attacks were expected with virtual certainty -
lent further credibility to the Namibian model of monitored elections as
a vital component of large-scale multilateral efforts to assist in rebuild-
ing civil societies.
The Namibian model has proliferated. The U.N. has monitored or
plans to monitor elections as part of large-scale social engineering
projects in Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, South Africa, Afghani
stan, and Georgia. These operations consume substantial resources, not
the least of which is the international community's willingness join risky
nation-building operations. The anti-U.N. backlash in the United States
in the wake of the Somalia operation's collapse demonstrates all too
graphically the toll such unsuccessful missions may take on U.N. legiti-
macy. But it is precisely in the scope and ambitiousness of these pro-
jects that one finds the most important implications for the nature of
self-determination. Democratic processes are attempts to hold territorial
states together, to create common bonds to legal and political institu-
tions, and to replace (or sublimate) loyalties to race, ethnicity, or reli-
gious groupings.21 Particularly when election monitoring is coupled
with nation-building activities such as demobilizing militias and creating
truth commissions,212 the evident goal of those planning such operations
is to create in existing territorial states a self-sustaining political commu-
nity. 3 The goal of fostering political democracy, in other words, is
antithetical to any conception of self-determination in which the self is
less than national in character.
Beigbeder points out two important ways in which U.N. electoral
practice may be linked to this process of normative evolution. First, the
standards adopted by U.N. monitors are explicitly drawn from human
210. Id.
211. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative, GLOBAL
Gov. 3, 8 (1995).
212. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Compara-
tive Study, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 597 (1994).
213. Despite an unprecedented degree of multilateral involvement in such traditional
local activities, the evident goal of the international community in remaking national political
institutions is to strengthen and not erode the functional sovereignty of the states involved.
For an elaboration of this view, see Gregory H. Fox, New Approaches to International
Human Rights: the Sovereign State Revisited, in CONTESTING SOVEREIGNTY (Sohail Hashmi
ed., forthcoming 1995).
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rights instruments, though in practice they have become considerably
more detailed than the treaty provisions.2"4 As a result, the U.N. has
addressed a number of controversial issues in electoral law that treaty
regimes had either avoided or confronted much later. For example, the
legitimacy of one party states was only addressed by the Human Rights
Committee in 1993,215 yet the U.N. had for years insisted that all major
groups be permitted to participate in the elections and referenda it
monitored.216 Doctrinally, the notion of internal self-determination
involves a canvass of international legal instruments that leads one to
view the right as an interpretive principle that in content does not ex-
ceed the sum of other political rights contained in those instruments.
The jurisprudence of self-determination so conceived is substantially
enriched if U.N. electoral practice is taken into account as integral to the
relevant body of legal precedent.
Second, in a related fashion, the institutionalization of monitoring at
the U.N. and elsewhere has created a de facto enforcement mechanism
of participatory norms. At the end of each mission, international observ-
ers are called upon to pronounce whether elections are "free and fair.
2 17
In most cases this conclusion is by no means absolute; instances of
incompetence, intimidation, or outright fraud must be balanced against
more positive aspects of the process. As a result, mission reports effec-
tively become adjudications of compliance with a broad panoply of
norms. Moreover, because monitors are understandably eager to mini-
mize the precariousness of these conclusions, they engage in an ongoing
dialogue with electoral authorities concerning problems evident in the
run-up to election day. This may, as in the cases of Namibia and Nica-
ragua, lead to substantial changes in the legal framework for the elec-
tions. Finally, a more indirect means of enforcement is evident in moni-
tors' consciousness of the systemic effects of their conclusions.
Beigbeder documents how monitors often seek to encourage democrati-
zation both by emphasizing positive aspects of elections and by issuing
214. The Secretary-General declared in 1992 that "the basic legal framework for the
[monitored] electoral process must be in conformity with the relevant principles enunciated in
fundamental international human rights agreements." Enhancing the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc.
A/47/668/Add.1 (1992), at 1, cited in BEIGBEDER, supra note 5, at 111.
215. Bwalya v. Zambia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Commun. No. 314/1988, reprinted in 14
HUM. RTS. L.J. 408 (1993).
216. See the discussion in Fox, supra note 113, at 572-90.
217. It is quite important to note that this and other aspects of monitoring have long
ceased to be solely United Nations functions. Regional organizations and nongovernmental
organizations have in some cases been more aggressive and innovative in their monitoring
activities. Beigbeder documents the activities of these two groups in chapters 8 and 9 respec-
tively. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 222-96.
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reports that speak only to discrete aspects of an electoral process, rather
than making an overall asessment of fairness.2 8 The assumption is that
positive reinforcement from the international community is more likely
to compel adherence to democratic norms than a categorically critical
judgment.
Not surprisingly, this normative and institutional mainstreaming of
election monitoring into the work of international organizations has
virtually eclipsed claims that such actions are contrary to traditional
notions of state sovereignty. The primary problems raised by the recent
missions canvassed by Beigbeder involve not claims of jurisdictional
overreaching by the U.N. but logistical problems of managing large
scale operations in situations where civil conflicts have not yet subsided
(Angola),2 9 a crucial party to an agreement to hold elections pulls out
(Cambodia),220 or a mission begins its work with crucial aspects of the
electoral process still to be negotiated (the Western Sahara).22 Claims of
infringed sovereignty have been nominally raised each year in a General
Assembly resolution cumbersomely entitled Respect for the Principles of
National Sovereignty and Non-Intervention in the Internal Affairs of
States in the Electoral Process.2' Even there, the objection that electoral
affairs are solely a domestic matter was substantially undercut in the last
version of the resolution adopted during South African apartheid by an
insistence on majority rule elections in South Africa.223
The waning of sovereignty objections to election monitoring carries
important implications for the self-determination principle. Among the
states traditionally claiming sovereignty over electoral matters have been
many battered by the centrifugal forces of nationalism and secession.
The actions of these "front line" states are necessarily central to any
attempted explication of the "self' through an examination of interna-
tional practice. That many of these states now support the multinational
democratic infrastructure described by Beigbeder suggests they may be
seeking inclusive and nonviolent solutions to their centrifugal crises. The
greater the inclusionary rights granted to their citizens, the more their
218. E.g., id. at 246-47, 252-54, 266.
219. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 180-84.
220. Id. at 198-212.
221. Id. at 191-97.
222. E.g. G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/49/180 (1994).
223. The Assembly declared that:
only the total eradication of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial, demo-
cratic society based on majority rule, through the full and free exercise of adult
suffrage by all the people in a united an non-fragmented South Africa, can lead to
a just and lasting solution to the situation in South Africa.
G.A. Res. 130, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/678/Add.2 (1992).
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practice approximates the "omnibus" conception of an internal right to
self-determination described above. As a result, the traditional conflict
over sovereign rights is largely inverted. Electoral assistance from the
international community enhances these states' capacity to function as
robust sovereign communities. Their sovereignty is perforated and
diminished when inclusionary politics is not practiced and rebellions
against central authority take their toll.
CONCLUSION
Reading Yves Beigbeder's book is an alternately rewarding and
frustrating experience. On the one hand, he has compiled an impressive
history of international electoral monitoring. On the other hand, for the
most part, the book does not venture organizing hypotheses or conclu-
sions beyond those evident on the surface of the practice under review.
Granted some of these self-evident issues are quite important, such as
the logistical questions raised by ambitious attempts to create an or-
dered, centralized government in states notable for their disorder and
diffusion of authority. But the problem with Beigbeder's focus is that
international lawyers make no unique contribution to the debate over
such questions. There is, for example, much new insight within the U.N.
itself on how these logistical hurdles may be surmounted. The legal
authority for conducting such ambitious missions, while controversial
initially, no longer requires extended justification.
A legal analysis, however, is central to the interpretive question of
how the international community's newfound concern for democratic
government accords with the shifting tiers of authority that increasingly
marks the post-Cold War world. Much has been written about the diffu-
sions of state power both upward to transnational entities and downward
to ethnic or "tribal" groupings. Whether election monitoring contributes
to an internal conception of the "self' is an aspect of this broader pro-
cess of shifting authority. The task for international lawyers here is not
an easy one. The very breadth of actors whose electoral activities
Beigbeder examines demonstrates the complexity of drawing uniform
normative conclusions. Moreover, because self-determination is such a
controversial topic, the actors themselves rarely venture opinions on the
nature of the right in their resolutions, reports, or diplomatic exchanges
on the subject.
Even so, international lawyers must persevere undeterred. This is the
essence of one's ultimate reaction to Beigbeder's study: he should not
have taken the easy route of presenting interesting data without ventur-
ing conclusions that would no doubt be controversial but that would not
be less interesting for being so. His hesitancy is unfortunate. The litera-
[Vol. 16:733
Spring 1995] Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era 781
ture on self-determination (mostly nonlegal) is also not short on theories
arguing for "appropriate" forms of group autonomy. All too often,
however, such accounts lack a grounding in international practice, which
is the surest guide to their relevance to policymakers. A study that
blended the best aspects of both approaches would certainly be wel-
come.
